Sorry about the truncated log - the full one is gzipped here:
http://www.charliebelmer.com/scallion.log.gz
I'll do some Chutney testing - I saw what looked like a good tutorial on
this list earlier this month so let me give it a shot.
Thanks!
On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 6:17 AM, Karsten Loesing wr
Here is another HS proposal draft.
This one specifies how to migrate from the current HS protocol to the
one specified in proposals "Migrate HS identity keys to Ed25519" and
"Stop HS address enumeration by HSDirs":
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-August/005279.html
https://list
On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 11:20:59AM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 10:57 AM, Leif Ryge wrote:
> > Is the following statement correct?
> >
> > When a user connects to Tor from multiple locations where the network is
> > monitored by the same adversary, their persistent use of
Hi,
I don't know what the current status/discussion for this is, hence this
email, a reply to a ticket # or mail thread would be fine too ;)
Is there currently a plan or way to state for a site:
"you can find us as hidden service X" ?
In DNS we could use something like:
www NAPTR
On 2013-09-12 22:00 , Kevin Butler wrote:
[..]
> I should have made my assumptions clearer. I am assuming the CA is
> compromised in this idea. I have assumed it is easy to make a
> counterfeit and valid cert from the root but it is hard(read infeasible)
> to generate one with the same fingerprint
