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Hello *,
During the last two weeks I was primarily busy packing literally
everything I own into boxes and unpacking it again, as well as other
logistics that have to be done when moving. My equipment as well as my
brain and the rest of me should be fu
These patches should allow you to build all modules (using GHC 7.6.3.)
if you apply them on the previous set [1]. /But please don’t expect
anything to work./
Now it’s time to actually test and reorganize the patches. Will it be
sane to resend the previous 12 patches (approximately 1500 lines) to
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 1:01 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
See also Roger's writeup at
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8244 ; it's pretty
informative IMO.
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On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 9:31 AM, Kang wrote:
> Hello.
> I was reading about hidden services and a thought occurred to me
> regarding the hash ring used in choosing and determining the HSDirs
> for a hidden service.
> As far as I can tell the hash ring is more or less static since a
> relay's posit
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 03:45:31AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 09:19:32AM +0200, Paul-Olivier Dehaye wrote:
> > The short summary of the weakness of Tor here:
> > - We would like the whole protocol to be mixing (to an observer, the
> > probability of exiting at any node
Hello.
I was reading about hidden services and a thought occurred to me
regarding the hash ring used in choosing and determining the HSDirs
for a hidden service.
As far as I can tell the hash ring is more or less static since a
relay's position is determined by their identity key, which doesn't
cha
Hello,
this accompanies my status report [1], and includes info how to query the
searchable metrics archive for anyone curious. I also refer to the original
(now semi-outdated) project proposal/document. [0] Only sending to
tor-dev@for now.
The Onionoo-like backend is listening on
http://ts.mkj.
P.S. (sorry) - it will also be possible to launch the backend on an EC2
instance, depending on load / curiosity. For now, this is running on a
relatively fragile development server.
--
Kostas.
0x0e5dce45 @ pgp.mit.edu
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 4:12 PM, Kostas Jakeliunas wrote:
> Hello,
>
> thi
Hello!
Updating on my Searchable Tor metrics archive project. (As is very evident)
I'm very open for naming suggestions. :)
To the best of my understanding and current satisfaction, I solved the
database bottlenecks, or at least I am, as of now, satisfied with the
current output from my benchmark
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 09:19:32AM +0200, Paul-Olivier Dehaye wrote:
> The short summary of the weakness of Tor here:
> - We would like the whole protocol to be mixing (to an observer, the
> probability of exiting at any node C given entrance at node A is close to
> 1/N),
Right, you're using termi
I use the word mixing 4 times, with two meanings:
"...enough mixing can happen..." : mathematical sense, on pairs of edges
around a node
"...yet highly mixing network..." : mathematical sense, on pairs of
entry/exit Tor nodes
"...between mixing chains and Tor, and can be seen as a lot of mixing
cha
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