Re: [tor-dev] Global semi-passive adversary: suggestion of using expanders

2013-08-22 Thread Tom Ritter
So I don't work for Tor, nor am I a graph theorist, but I'll add a few preliminary thoughts. On 22 August 2013 21:08, Paul-Olivier Dehaye wrote: > As far as I can tell, the main threat by a global passive adversary comes > from traffic analysis (?). A Global Passive Adversary is technically outs

[tor-dev] Global semi-passive adversary: suggestion of using expanders

2013-08-22 Thread Paul-Olivier Dehaye
Hello, Thank you for working on Tor. I have a suggestion and would appreciate input. Please bear with me as I have a limited understanding of the design of Tor and all the different threats that it is meant to mitigate. Below, a (?) indicates a place where I need some confirmation that my underst

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 222: Stop sending client timestamps

2013-08-22 Thread Maxim Kammerer
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:46 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote: >Despite this late date, many hosts aren't running NTP and >don't have very well synchronized clocks. Even more hosts >aren't running a secure NTP; it's probably easy to >desynchronize target hosts. Not strongly related to the

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 222: Stop sending client timestamps

2013-08-22 Thread Nick Mathewson
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 12:33 PM, George Kadianakis wrote: [...] >> 2.2. AUTHENTICATE (server) >> >>The AUTHENTICATE cell is not ordinarily sent by clients. It >>contains an 8-byte timestamp and a 16-byte random value. >>Instead, let's replace both with a 24-byte (truncated) HMAC of >

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 222: Stop sending client timestamps

2013-08-22 Thread George Kadianakis
Nick Mathewson writes: > Filename: 222-remove-client-timestamps.txt > Title: Stop sending client timestamps > Authors: Nick Mathewson > Created: 22 August 2013 > Target: 0.2.5.x > Status: Open > > 0. Summary > >There are a few places in Tor where clients and servers send >timestamps. I l

[tor-dev] Proposal 222: Stop sending client timestamps

2013-08-22 Thread Nick Mathewson
Filename: 222-remove-client-timestamps.txt Title: Stop sending client timestamps Authors: Nick Mathewson Created: 22 August 2013 Target: 0.2.5.x Status: Open 0. Summary There are a few places in Tor where clients and servers send timestamps. I list them and discuss how to eliminate them.

Re: [tor-dev] Segfault trying to start tor in 0.2.4.16-rc with bufferevents

2013-08-22 Thread Ian Goldberg
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 10:25:00AM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote: > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 10:17 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote: > > I just tried to upgrade my tor exit node to 0.2.4.16-rc, and got this: > > > I rebuilt without bufferevents, and it hasn't crashed yet. (I also > > don't see the "Something

[tor-dev] Segfault trying to start tor in 0.2.4.16-rc with bufferevents

2013-08-22 Thread Ian Goldberg
I just tried to upgrade my tor exit node to 0.2.4.16-rc, and got this: Aug 22 09:55:09.000 [warn] Something tried to close an or_connection_t without going through channels at src/or/connection.c:3185 Aug 22 09:55:10.000 [warn] Something tried to close an or_connection_t without going through chan

Re: [tor-dev] Segfault trying to start tor in 0.2.4.16-rc with bufferevents

2013-08-22 Thread Nick Mathewson
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 10:17 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote: > I just tried to upgrade my tor exit node to 0.2.4.16-rc, and got this: > I rebuilt without bufferevents, and it hasn't crashed yet. (I also > don't see the "Something tried to close an or_connection_t" warnings.) Seems likely. This is a d