Hi George,
I've released FTE v0.1.2-alpha. This release includes bug fixes and an
improved build process. You can obtain the new builds from the
official FTE website: https://kpdyer.com/fte/
The v0.1.2-alpha binaries have been tested on Ubuntu 12.10, Ubuntu
13.04, RHEL 6.4 and OSX 10.8.4. The 32-
Hi Steven,
I deeply apologize for not replying to your emails in the last few weeks. On
July 2, I had a bad car accident, and since then I was staying in hospital
after a surgery till July 27. I should have let you know earlier to get things
less messed up. Sorry again about this. Now I finall
I have some catching up to do on obfsproxy :). I think obviously agility in
pushing out these kinds of solutions is very important, so making a
separate python client sounds like a great idea.
As for TLS handshake profiling - well, that was also discussed in the
original video, but as that video m
Hey Everyone,
I wanted to give quick update on N23 rebasing progress:
- Rebase N23 onto Master (Complete)
- Refactor N23 to use channels (Complete)
- Make clean w/ check-spaces (50%. ETA 7/28)
- Testing with Chutney (To-Do)
Charlie
On Thu, Jul 18, 2013 at 11:43 AM, Karsten Loesing
On Sat, Jul 27, 2013 at 05:17:29PM +0300, Lag Inimaineb wrote:
> Specifically, after reading Nick Mathewson's proposal, I can see it is pretty
> much identical to what I've proposed (though his proposal has been around for
> more than a year). Do you have any information as to whether anyone has
>
On 27 July 2013 10:17, Lag Inimaineb wrote:
> As for suggestions such as SWEET, FreeWave, etc. - those would require
> changes to the TOR clients (right?), which makes them probably less easy to
> use, unless they are merged into the TOR mainline. Same goes for
> ScambleSuit, since the shared secr
Thanks for your response, I'm glad to hear this problem is still
interesting :).
Specifically, after reading Nick Mathewson's proposal, I can see it is
pretty much identical to what I've proposed (though his proposal has been
around for more than a year). Do you have any information as to whether
On 26 July 2013 23:56, Andreas Krey wrote:
> On Tue, 02 Jul 2013 23:42:20 +, Ximin Luo wrote:
> ...
>> What sort of PKI are you using to verify the pubkey claimed by either side,
>> to
>> prevent MitM?
>
> What for? The authentication happens in the next step,
> within the OR/bridge protocol.
On Sat, Jul 06, 2013 at 09:34:06PM +0300, Lag Inimaineb wrote:
> Anyway, one of the main topics discussed in that talk was the problem of
> preventing the blockage of TOR bridges by oppressors. While many "fixes" were
> mentioned, none of them actually solve the problem of the bridge being
> probed
