On 2012-03-12, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 8:32 PM, Robert Ransom
> wrote:
>> But http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/bear-lion.pdf and an
>> end-to-end MAC is more likely as a solution to the end-to-end tagging
>> attack, because (a) per-hop MACs would take up much more space
On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 8:32 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 2012-03-11, The23rd Raccoon wrote:
>
> But http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/bear-lion.pdf and an
> end-to-end MAC is more likely as a solution to the end-to-end tagging
> attack, because (a) per-hop MACs would take up much more space
On 2012-03-11, The23rd Raccoon wrote:
> The crypto-tagger achieves amplification by being destructive to a
> circuit if the tagged cell is not untagged by them at the exit of the
> network, and also by being destructive when a non-tagged cell is
> "untagged" on a circuit coming from a non-tagging
Analysis of the Relative Severity of Tagging Attacks:
Hey hey, ho ho! AES-CTR mode has got to go!
A cypherpunk riot brought to you by:
The 23 Raccoons
Abstract
Gather round the dumpster, humans. It's time for your Raccoon
ov
Karsten,
I have some time to work on Torperf right now, and I see that there
are some changes in the works (#3036). Can you suggest to me which
ticket(s) could currently most use my help?
---
Sincerely Yours,
---Thomas S. Benjamin
___
tor
