On 2012-01-18, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Robert Ransom
> wrote:
>
>> With that hack on top of the v3 protocol, any client able to detect
>> that a bridge is not being MITMed can impersonate the bridge through
>> the TLS handshake, until after the (honest, victim) cl
On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> With that hack on top of the v3 protocol, any client able to detect
> that a bridge is not being MITMed can impersonate the bridge through
> the TLS handshake, until after the (honest, victim) client speaks the
> Tor protocol at the fake bri
On Wed, Jan 18, 2012 at 07:07:08AM +, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 2012-01-17, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 08:43:00PM +0200, George Kadianakis wrote:
> >> [0]: Did the Telex people clean up the patch, generalize it, and post
> >> it in openssl-dev? Having configurable {Server,
