On Tue, 03 Jan 2012 19:52:00 +, Julian Yon said:
jry> Eventually Alice takes a vacation and Mallory is
jry> successful at keeping the service offline for $expiry_time. At
jry> this point the nym can be hijacked as no secret is needed to
jry> claim it.
Two things here.
Firstl
On 02/01/12 10:59, William Waites wrote:
> What if instead, we used a similar mechanism as we already have for
> the hidden services and do say hash("antani").nym and push that out to
> the introduction hosts. The introduction hosts would check if they can
> resolve it, if they can, the request is
>>> A sample session goes like this:
>>> 1. The user starts a connector and a Tor client. The connector sends its
>>>address to the facilitator, so that a proxy will know where to
>>>connect to. (We call this step "rendezvous.")
>>> 2. A flash proxy appears in a browser and asks the facilit
On 01/02/2012 02:39 PM, caine tighe wrote:
> there is serious value in ensuring Tor is an option for both Android
> and iOS. Currently we support Tor via Orbot on Android via the HTTP/S
> proxy method since the SOCKS method is known to have DNS leaks.
I agree! As a side note, in Orweb v2, when yo
FYI, OpenSSL v1.0.1-beta1 seems to work fine when building and running Tor
v0.2.2.35 (Linux/i686).
Too early to say anything about performance (critical as the crypto is the
performance bottleneck in Tor) but it definitely works as a drop-in replacement
for OpenSSL v1.0.0e.
http://marc.info/?l
