Re: [tor-dev] [Patch] or/eventdns.c

2011-11-08 Thread Nick Mathewson
On Wed, Oct 19, 2011 at 3:24 PM, Gisle Vanem wrote: Ow. Sorry for the delay here. Patches that don't make it onto the bugtracker tend to drop off my radar far too easily. :( I can't merge this one because we're trying to minimize drift between Libevent's evdns.c and Tor's eventdns.c. Once we

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries

2011-11-08 Thread George Kadianakis
Alright, posting an updated version of this proposal. It features shortened fingerprints and discussion on the certificate tagging. I hope 39 Base32 characters feel OK. If not, state your arguments and preferred solutions and I will update the proposal locally; I will try to not spam the list even

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries

2011-11-08 Thread Marsh Ray
On 11/08/2011 09:36 AM, George Kadianakis wrote: Some arguments to consider against the tagging idea are: c) We most probably won't be able to tag CA-signed certificates. TLS 1.0 over TCP port 443 with a server cert rooting to a well-known CA is probably the biggest stream of opaque traffic o

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries

2011-11-08 Thread George Kadianakis
Julian Yon writes: > On 08/11/11 07:55, Jérémy Bobbio wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 08, 2011 at 12:46:45AM +0100, George Kadianakis wrote: >>>Tor clients who use bridges and want to pin their SSL certificates >>>must specify the bridge's SSL certificate fingerprint as in: >>> Bridge 12.34.56

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries

2011-11-08 Thread Julian Yon
On 08/11/11 07:55, Jérémy Bobbio wrote: > On Tue, Nov 08, 2011 at 12:46:45AM +0100, George Kadianakis wrote: >>Tor clients who use bridges and want to pin their SSL certificates >>must specify the bridge's SSL certificate fingerprint as in: >> Bridge 12.34.56.78 shared_secret=934caff42

Re: [tor-dev] Implement JSONP interface for check.torproject.org

2011-11-08 Thread warms0x
> (Off-list reply to avoid unnecessary archive bits :)) Well damn. Since I already screwed up, I might as well apologize with another unnecessary email to the list. ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-b

Re: [tor-dev] Implement JSONP interface for check.torproject.org

2011-11-08 Thread warms0x
(Off-list reply to avoid unnecessary archive bits :)) Thanks for the clarification, I wasn't even aware of the bulk exit exporter! Cheers. ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor

Re: [tor-dev] Implement JSONP interface for check.torproject.org

2011-11-08 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 11/08/2011 12:29 AM, warms0x wrote: >> On 11/05/2011 06:26 PM, Arturo Filastò wrote: >>> I have made a patch to check.torproject.org to expose a JSONP interface >>> that would allow people to have the user check client side if (s)he is >>> using Tor. >>> >>> This would allow people to embed a ba

Re: [tor-dev] Implement JSONP interface for check.torproject.org

2011-11-08 Thread warms0x
> On 11/05/2011 06:26 PM, Arturo Filastò wrote: >> I have made a patch to check.torproject.org to expose a JSONP interface >> that would allow people to have the user check client side if (s)he is >> using Tor. >> >> This would allow people to embed a badge on their website >> (privacybadge.html) t

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries

2011-11-08 Thread Jérémy Bobbio
On Tue, Nov 08, 2011 at 12:46:45AM +0100, George Kadianakis wrote: >Tor clients who use bridges and want to pin their SSL certificates >must specify the bridge's SSL certificate fingerprint as in: > Bridge 12.34.56.78 shared_secret=934caff420aa7852b855 \ > > link_cert_fpr=38b