Re: ASLR bypass on OpenBSD-5.6

2015-01-14 Thread Mathias Svensson
On Wed, Jan 14, 2015 at 5:52 PM, Theo de Raadt wrote: >> > By the time an attacker has the control to search down, he surely >> > already is capable of doing something other things. "Searching" >> > almost certainly implies he is executing or ROP'ing. >> >> This is perhaps just me coming from the

Re: ASLR bypass on OpenBSD-5.6

2015-01-14 Thread Mathias Svensson
himself. It would on average only require him 16384 connetions to guess correctly. I would consider more than "some" scenarios, but perhaps I'm biased. :) On Wed, Jan 14, 2015 at 5:07 PM, Theo de Raadt wrote: >> On Wed, Jan 14, 2015 at 3:44 PM, Mathias Svensson wrote: &g

Re: ASLR bypass on OpenBSD-5.6

2015-01-14 Thread Mathias Svensson
On Wed, Jan 14, 2015 at 3:44 PM, Mathias Svensson wrote: > Calls to malloc or mmap seems to be chosen randomly among 2 ** 20 > pages placed at a constant offset above the base of the binary. > While none of these numbers are great (25 bits to base address with > no knowledge, 20 bit

ASLR bypass on OpenBSD-5.6

2015-01-14 Thread Mathias Svensson
base of the binary. While none of these numbers are great (25 bits to base address with no knowledge, 20 bits if knowing another pointer), they are not particularly bad either. -- Mathias Svensson bypass.c: #include #include #ifdef __amd64__ #define USRSTACK 0x7f7fc000 #else #ifdef __i386__