Re: [systemd-devel] Environment-variable security?

2018-11-30 Thread Marek Howard
Lennart Poettering píše v Pá 30. 11. 2018 v 18:16 +0100: > On Fr, 30.11.18 17:04, Marek Howard ([email protected]) wrote: > > I understand, but that's by design and there's nothing wrong with that. > > It's even useful for the case where you want wrap a thing with

Re: [systemd-devel] Environment-variable security?

2018-11-30 Thread Marek Howard
Lennart Poettering píše v Pá 30. 11. 2018 v 14:53 +0100: > On Fr, 30.11.18 14:25, Marek Howard ([email protected]) wrote: > > > - Lennart keeps repeating that passing secrets via environment variable > > is insecure because they are passed down the process tree. They are, if &g

Re: [systemd-devel] Environment-variable security?

2018-11-30 Thread Marek Howard
Marek Howard píše v Pá 30. 11. 2018 v 14:25 +0100: > Give me one solid reason why it's insecure to pass passwords via > environment variables please. So far it seems that systemd just broke > this concept for no valid reason and now you try to defend with > completely unrelated re

Re: [systemd-devel] Environment-variable security?

2018-11-30 Thread Marek Howard
David Parsley píše v St 14. 11. 2018 v 08:45 -0500: > > On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 3:43 AM Lennart Poettering > wrote: > > I mean, seriously, people do lots of stuff. It doesn't mean that all > > what people do is actually a good idea or just safe. > > Certainly agreed on this point. It is my beli

Re: [systemd-devel] Environment-variable security?

2018-11-13 Thread Marek Howard
Marek Howard píše v St 14. 11. 2018 v 01:35 +0100: > Lennart Poettering píše v Út 13. 11. 2018 v 15:17 +0100: > > On Di, 13.11.18 07:49, David Parsley ([email protected]) wrote: > > Well, you are of course welcome to ignore whatever I say, but again, > > environment b

Re: [systemd-devel] Environment-variable security?

2018-11-13 Thread Marek Howard
Lennart Poettering píše v Út 13. 11. 2018 v 15:17 +0100: > On Di, 13.11.18 07:49, David Parsley ([email protected]) wrote: > > > I disagree; privacy of environment variables to individual users on the > > system is as fundamental as Unix file permissions. If a privileged process > > (systemd)

Re: [systemd-devel] cryptsetup open invoked from udev rule fails

2018-11-04 Thread Marek Howard
So many revealings in one reply! Thank you very much for explaining it in basic terms to me. Mantas Mikulėnas píše v Ne 04. 11. 2018 v 18:18 +0200: > You should just put an entry in /etc/crypttab instead, and let > systemd-cryptsetup handle it via the existing dependencies mechanism. > > bac

[systemd-devel] cryptsetup open invoked from udev rule fails

2018-11-04 Thread Marek Howard
Hello. I'm trying to unlock my LUKS (type luks2) encrypted backup drive via udev rule /etc/udev/rules.d/99-unlock-backupdrive.rules: ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{DEVTYPE}=="partition", \ ENV{ID_SERIAL}=="FZ133888", ENV{ID_PART_ENTRY_UUID}=="8c347a-02", \ RUN+="/root/unlock-bac