On 02/03/2025 16:59, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
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On 2.03.2025 15:54, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
On 2.03.2025 15:53, Avihai Horon wrote:
On 19/02/2025 22:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
External email: Use caution opening links or atta
On 2.03.2025 15:54, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
On 2.03.2025 15:53, Avihai Horon wrote:
On 19/02/2025 22:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
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From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
On 2.03.2025 15:53, Avihai Horon wrote:
On 19/02/2025 22:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
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From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the destination, otherwise a maliciou
On 19/02/2025 22:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
External email: Use caution opening links or attachments
From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the destination, otherwise a malicious QEMU source could
theoretically cause
On 28.02.2025 09:53, Cédric Le Goater wrote:
On 2/27/25 23:01, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
On 27.02.2025 07:48, Cédric Le Goater wrote:
On 2/19/25 21:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the
On 2/27/25 23:01, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
On 27.02.2025 07:48, Cédric Le Goater wrote:
On 2/19/25 21:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the destination, otherwise a malicious QEMU sourc
On 27.02.2025 07:48, Cédric Le Goater wrote:
On 2/19/25 21:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the destination, otherwise a malicious QEMU source could
theoretically cause the target QEMU to
On 2/19/25 21:34, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the destination, otherwise a malicious QEMU source could
theoretically cause the target QEMU to allocate unlimited amounts of memory
for buff
From: "Maciej S. Szmigiero"
Allow capping the maximum count of in-flight VFIO device state buffers
queued at the destination, otherwise a malicious QEMU source could
theoretically cause the target QEMU to allocate unlimited amounts of memory
for buffers-in-flight.
Since this is not expected to b
