The Keystone SA module has a hardware random generator module.
This commit adds binding doc for the KS2 SA HWRNG driver.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Andrianov
Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri
---
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/ks-sa-rng.txt | 21 +
1 file changed, 21 inserti
Keystone Security Accelerator module has a hardware random generator
sub-module. This commit adds the driver for this sub-module.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Andrianov
[t-kri...@ti.com: dropped one unnecessary dev_err message]
Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo
Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri
---
drivers/ch
Keyston2 Security Accelerator has a hardware random generator sub-module.
This series adds the driver for the sub-module.
Vitaly Andrianov (2):
Documentation: dt: rng: add bindings doc for Keystone SA HWRNG driver
hw_random: keystone2: add hw_random driver
.../devicetree/bindings/rng/ks-sa-r
ahash_request 'req' argument passed by the caller
omap_sham_handle_queue() cannot be NULL here because it is obtained from
non-NULL pointer via container_of().
This fixes smatch warning:
drivers/crypto/omap-sham.c:812 omap_sham_prepare_request() warn: variable
dereferenced before check 'req'
ahash_request 'req' argument passed by the caller
s5p_hash_handle_queue() cannot be NULL here because it is obtained from
non-NULL pointer via container_of().
This fixes smatch warning:
drivers/crypto/s5p-sss.c:1213 s5p_hash_prepare_request() warn: variable
dereferenced before check 'req' (se
Improve the code (safety and readability) by indicating that data passed
through pointer is not modified. This adds const keyword in many places,
most notably:
- the driver data (pointer to struct samsung_aes_variant),
- scatterlist addresses written as value to device registers,
- key and IV a
Commit 8043bb1ae03c ("crypto: omap-sham - convert driver logic to use
sgs for data xmit") removed the if() clause leaving the statement as is.
The intention was in that case to finish the request always so the goto
instruction seems sensible.
Remove the indentation to fix Smatch warning:
drive
On 02/27/2018 10:07 PM, Vladimir Zapolskiy wrote:
> On 02/27/2018 09:39 PM, Kim Phillips wrote:
>> On Tue, 27 Feb 2018 18:53:08 +0200
>> Vladimir Zapolskiy wrote:
>>
>>> On 02/27/2018 05:49 PM, Kim Phillips wrote:
On Mon, 26 Feb 2018 20:38:49 +0200
Vladimir Zapolskiy wrote:
> +
To support cryptographic communication with the TPM, we need to add
Cipher FeedBack (CFB) mode for stream encryption because this is the
mandated encryption scheme for all encrypted parameters and responses.
Additionally, we ran across a problem in the elliptic curve routines
in that the size of t
TPM security routines require encryption and decryption with AES in
CFB mode, so add it to the Linux Crypto schemes. CFB is basically a
one time pad where the pad is generated initially from the encrypted
IV and then subsequently from the encrypted previous block of
ciphertext. The pad is XOR'd i
Apparently the ecdh use case was in bluetooth which always has single
element scatterlists, so the ecdh module was hard coded to expect
them. Now we're using this in TPM, we need multi-element
scatterlists, so remove this limitation.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley
---
crypto/ecdh.c | 23 +++
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