On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 08:25:02AM -0700, Tadeusz Struk wrote:
> Yes, but now mpi_get_buffer() calls mpi_read_buffer() and it is also
> used by security/keys/dh.c
It appears to be using mpi_read_buffer gratuitously. It should
simply use mpi_get_buffer.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu
Home Page: h
On 06/24/2016 07:28 AM, Herbert Xu wrote:
> Didn't we add mpi_read_buffer specifically for akcipher before
> we switched over to SGs? If nobody is using it we should just
> delete it.
Yes, but now mpi_get_buffer() calls mpi_read_buffer() and it is also
used by security/keys/dh.c
Thanks,
--
TS
--
T
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 08:25:05AM -0700, Tadeusz Struk wrote:
>
> The reason why mpi_write_to_sgl() strips the leading zeros is only
> because we said that it needs to work in the same way as the
> mpi_read_buffer(), which does remove it for whatever reason.
> So should we now change the mpi_read
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 11:23:06AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>
> Patch 2 introduces the bug.
>
> Note, with patch 2, there is also a compile warning with crypto/dh.c.
Oh I see. It's a conflict with the kpp stuff that didn't exist
when I wrote this.
Let me respin the patches on top of kpp.
Am Freitag, 24. Juni 2016, 16:41:47 schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
> On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 09:27:12AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Am Mittwoch, 22. Juni 2016, 18:14:32 schrieb Herbert Xu:
> >
> > Hi Herbert,
> >
> > Something breaks with this patch set in public_key_verify_signature
> >
Am Freitag, 24. Juni 2016, 16:41:47 schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
> On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 09:27:12AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Am Mittwoch, 22. Juni 2016, 18:14:32 schrieb Herbert Xu:
> >
> > Hi Herbert,
> >
> > Something breaks with this patch set in public_key_verify_signature
> >
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 09:27:12AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Mittwoch, 22. Juni 2016, 18:14:32 schrieb Herbert Xu:
>
> Hi Herbert,
>
> Something breaks with this patch set in public_key_verify_signature
>
> I get tons of these:
>
> [1.838720] PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trus
Am Mittwoch, 22. Juni 2016, 18:14:32 schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
Something breaks with this patch set in public_key_verify_signature
I get tons of these:
[1.838720] PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key
Furthermore, my CAVS testing with public_key_verify_signature always EINV
Hi Herbert,
On 06/22/2016 03:14 AM, Herbert Xu wrote:
> This was prompted by the caam RSA submission where a lot of work
> was done just to strip the RSA output of leading zeroes. This is
> in fact completely pointless because the only user of RSA in the
> kernel then promptly puts them back.
>
>
