Hi,
> Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha
> implementations in the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block
> counter, and therefore allowed seeking to any point in the keystream,
> exposing the full functionality of the cipher.
If I remember correctly, it was indeed in
Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating
> our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a
> little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end
> bits of the counter get mapped onto the ChaCha20
On 8 December 2017 at 23:11, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 10:54:24PM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> >> Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha
>> >> takes.
>> >> The original paper by Daniel Bernstein
>> >> (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.
On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 10:54:24PM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha
> >> takes.
> >> The original paper by Daniel Bernstein
> >> (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter
> >> is
> >> 64-bit an
On 8 December 2017 at 22:42, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 8 December 2017 at 22:17, Eric Biggers wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 11:55:02AM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating
>>> our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk
On 8 December 2017 at 22:17, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 11:55:02AM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating
>> our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a
>> little endian counter as the
On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 11:55:02AM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating
> our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a
> little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end
> bits of