On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 9:45 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman
wrote:
> If it's needed no matter what, can you make it the first patch in the
> series? And does it need to go to any older kernels as well?
I believe it does belong in older kernels too. I'll work out precisely
which one those are and note it
On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 01:47:25AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> As this RFC series matures, all the changes are in this branch here, to look
> at:
>
> https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/log/?h=jd/rng-blocker
>
> Ted -- there's one, in particular, that should probably be picked up
> regardless
As this RFC series matures, all the changes are in this branch here, to look at:
https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/log/?h=jd/rng-blocker
Ted -- there's one, in particular, that should probably be picked up
regardless of the rest, and that's "random: invalidate batched entropy
after crng init". Hope
As discussed in [1], there is a problem with get_random_bytes being
used before the RNG has actually been seeded. The solution for fixing
this appears to be multi-pronged. One of those prongs involves adding
a simple blocking API so that modules that use the RNG in process
context can just sleep (i
