On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 08:59:54AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> Or change it to b[1] = b[0] (assuming the compiler allows struct
> assignment in that way). This will always copy XTS_BLOCK_SIZE bytes,
> but we have sufficient space, and it is probably more efficient too
> in most cases.
Sounds
On Fri, 17 Jul 2020 at 08:21, Herbert Xu wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 06:56:30PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Colin Ian King
> > >
> > > There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> > > from sourc
On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 06:56:30PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King wrote:
> >
> > From: Colin Ian King
> >
> > There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> > from source b to destination b + 1. Fix this by using the safer
> > memmov
On 16/07/2020 16:56, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King wrote:
>>
>> From: Colin Ian King
>>
>> There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
>> from source b to destination b + 1. Fix this by using the safer
>> memmove instead.
>>
>> Addresses-
On Thu, 16 Jul 2020 at 18:29, Colin King wrote:
>
> From: Colin Ian King
>
> There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
> from source b to destination b + 1. Fix this by using the safer
> memmove instead.
>
> Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
> Fix
From: Colin Ian King
There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
from source b to destination b + 1. Fix this by using the safer
memmove instead.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext steal
