On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 12:00:27AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
> of the stack pointer, to prevent stack overrun exploits from corrupting
> the control flow. However, this requires that the AUTIASP is issued with
> SP holding t
> (+ Andy)
Thanks! Applied to cryptogams, pinged openssl. Cheers.
(+ Andy)
On Tue, 27 Oct 2020 at 00:04, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> On Tue, 27 Oct 2020 at 00:03, Eric Biggers wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 12:00:27AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
> > > of the stack pointer, to pr
On Tue, 27 Oct 2020 at 00:03, Eric Biggers wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 12:00:27AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
> > of the stack pointer, to prevent stack overrun exploits from corrupting
> > the control flow. However,
On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 12:00:27AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
> of the stack pointer, to prevent stack overrun exploits from corrupting
> the control flow. However, this requires that the AUTIASP is issued with
> SP holding t
PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
of the stack pointer, to prevent stack overrun exploits from corrupting
the control flow. However, this requires that the AUTIASP is issued with
SP holding the same value as it held when the PAC value was generated.
The Poly1305
