Hi,
On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 07:58:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Mon 2018-08-06 18:39:58, joeyli wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 04:45:34PM +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > Hi Pavel,
> > > On Sun, Aug 05, 2018 at 12:02:00PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > &
Hi Pavel, Joey, Oliver
Please let me describe the original requirement and my
understanding about hibernation encryption here, thus
help us sync on the same thread:
On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 07:50:36PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> > > > > User space doesn't need to involve. The EFI root key
On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 06:39:58PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 04:45:34PM +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > Hi Pavel,
> > On Sun, Aug 05, 2018 at 12:02:00PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > Hi!
> > >
> > > > > User space doesn
On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 12:20:20PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> On Mo, 2018-08-06 at 15:57 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > Hi Oliver,
> > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > >
On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 05:48:04PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 03:57:54PM +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > Hi Oliver,
> > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > >
Hi Pavel,
On Sun, Aug 05, 2018 at 12:02:00PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> > > User space doesn't need to involve. The EFI root key is generated by
> > > EFI boot stub and be transfer to kernel. It's stored in EFI boot service
> > > variable that it can only be accessed by trusted EFI binar
Hi Oliver,
On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> >
> > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people
> > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the
> > kernel
Hi Joey,
On Tue, Jul 31, 2018 at 01:04:15AM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 04:14:04PM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > &g
Hello,
On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 02:22:27PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> > > > 2. Ideally kernel memory should be encrypted by the
> > > >kernel itself. We have uswsusp to support user
> > > >space hibernation, however doing the encryption
> > > >in kernel space has more advantag
Hi,
On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 01:42:36PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> On Fr, 2018-07-20 at 12:25 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > Hi!
>
> Hello,
>
> > > Let me paste the log here:
> > >
> > > 1. (This is not to compare with uswsusp but other
> > > tools) One advantage is: Users do not have to
>
On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 01:01:49PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Thu 2018-07-19 07:58:51, Yu Chen wrote:
> > Hi,
> > On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 10:22:35PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > On Thu 2018-07-19 00:38:06, Chen Yu wrote:
> > > > As security becomes mo
Cc linux-ker...@vger.kernel.org and linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 12:40:14AM +0800, Chen Yu wrote:
> This is the core modification to encrypt the hibernation image.
> It leverages the helper functions to encrypt the page data before
> they are submitted to the block device.
Hi,
On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 10:22:35PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Thu 2018-07-19 00:38:06, Chen Yu wrote:
> > As security becomes more and more important, we add the in-kernel
> > encryption support for hibernation.
>
> Sorry, this does not really explain what security benefit it is
> suppose
Hi Stephan,
thanks for your reply,
On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 1:43 AM Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Dienstag, 22. Mai 2018, 05:00:40 CEST schrieb Yu Chen:
> Hi Yu,
> > Hi all,
> > The request is that, we'd like to generate a symmetric key derived from
> > user provi
Hi all,
The request is that, we'd like to generate a symmetric key derived from
user provided passphase(not rely on any third-party library). May I know if
there is a PBKDF2(Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) support in the
kernel? (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898#5.2)
We have hmac sha1
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