On Mon Oct 07 19, Sumit Garg wrote:
Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted
and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also,
remove tpm1_buf code.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg
---
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar
struct tpm1_buf *tb;
int ret;
tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
- struct tpm_buf *tb;
On Fri Oct 11 19, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Mon, Oct 07, 2019 at 10:55:31AM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
This patch-set does restructuring of trusted keys code to create and
consolidate trusted keys subsystem.
Also, patch #2 replaces tpm1_buf code used in security/keys/trusted.c and
crypto/asymmert
On Fri Oct 04 19, Jerry Snitselaar wrote:
On Fri Oct 04 19, James Bottomley wrote:
On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 11:33 -0700, Jerry Snitselaar wrote:
On Fri Oct 04 19, James Bottomley wrote:
On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 21:22 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 04:59:37PM -0700, Ja
On Fri Oct 04 19, James Bottomley wrote:
On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 11:33 -0700, Jerry Snitselaar wrote:
On Fri Oct 04 19, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 21:22 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 04:59:37PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> >
On Fri Oct 04 19, James Bottomley wrote:
On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 21:22 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 04:59:37PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> I think the principle of using multiple RNG sources for strong keys
> is a sound one, so could I propose a compromise: We have a
On Thu Sep 26 19, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
Only the kernel random pool should be used for generating random numbers.
TPM contributes to that pool among the other sources of entropy. In here it
is not, agreed, absolutely critical because TPM is what is trusted anyway
but in order to remove tpm_get_r
