Re: [PATCH, RFC -v2] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call

2014-07-18 Thread Florian Weimer
ag or something like that which means "block/return EAGAIN until the kernel pool is initialized"? Thanks. (See the previous discussion about pool initialization.) -- Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-cryp

Re: [PATCH] crypto_mem_not_equal: add constant-time equality testing of memory regions

2013-09-16 Thread Florian Weimer
* James Yonan: > noinline unsigned long __crypto_mem_not_equal(const void *a, const > void *b, size_t size); > > static inline int crypto_mem_not_equal(const void *a, const void *b, > size_t size) { > return __crypto_mem_not_equal(a, b, size) != 0UL ? 1 : 0; > } > > This hides the fact that

Re: [PATCH] crypto_mem_not_equal: add constant-time equality testing of memory regions

2013-09-15 Thread Florian Weimer
* James Yonan: > + * Constant-time equality testing of memory regions. > + * Returns 0 when data is equal, non-zero otherwise. > + * Fast path if size == 16. > + */ > +noinline unsigned long crypto_mem_not_equal(const void *a, const void *b, > size_t size) I think this should really return unsig

Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot

2013-09-01 Thread Florian Weimer
* Matthew Garrett: > On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 12:41:22PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > >> But if you don't generate fresh keys on every boot, the persistent >> keys are mor exposed to other UEFI applications. Correct me if I'm >> wrong, but I don't thin

Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot

2013-09-01 Thread Florian Weimer
* joeyli: > Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load > private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we > don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above > procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time. But if you don't ge

Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot

2013-08-28 Thread Florian Weimer
* Chun-Yi Lee: > + EFI bootloader must generate RSA key-pair when system boot: >- Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself >- Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to > kernel. Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular