Re: [PATCH] crypto: Limit MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA to SHA384 or SHA512

2023-10-10 Thread Luis Chamberlain
On Tue, Oct 10, 2023 at 10:27:55PM +0100, Dimitri John Ledkov wrote: > NIST FIPS 186-5 states that it is recommended that the security > strength associated with the bit length of n and the security strength > of the hash function be the same, or higher upon agreement. Given NIST > P384 curve is us

[PATCH] crypto: Limit MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA to SHA384 or SHA512

2023-10-10 Thread Dimitri John Ledkov
NIST FIPS 186-5 states that it is recommended that the security strength associated with the bit length of n and the security strength of the hash function be the same, or higher upon agreement. Given NIST P384 curve is used, force using either SHA384 or SHA512. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov

[PATCH] module: Do not offer sha224 for built-in module signing

2023-10-10 Thread Dimitri John Ledkov
sha224 does not provide enough security against collision attacks relative to the default keys used for signing (RSA 4k & P-384). Also sha224 never became popular, as sha256 got widely adopter ahead of sha224 being introduced. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov --- kernel/module/Kconfig | 5

[PATCH] crypto: pkcs7: remove sha1 support

2023-10-10 Thread Dimitri John Ledkov
Removes support for sha1 signed kernel modules, importing sha1 signed x.509 certificates. rsa-pkcs1pad keeps sha1 padding support, which seems to be used by virtio driver. sha1 remains available as there are many drivers and subsystems using it. Note only hmac(sha1) with secret keys remains crypt