On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 10:17:15AM +0530, Anup Patel wrote:
> +config BCM_SBA_RAID
> +tristate "Broadcom SBA RAID engine support"
> +depends on (ARM64 && MAILBOX && RAID6_PQ) || COMPILE_TEST
> +select DMA_ENGINE
> +select DMA_ENGINE_RAID
> + select ASYNC_TX_ENABL
On Sun, Feb 05, 2017 at 12:10:53AM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Another thing that might be helpful is that you can let gcc decide on
> the alignment, and then optimize appropriately. Check out what we do
> with siphash:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next.git/tre
Another thing that might be helpful is that you can let gcc decide on
the alignment, and then optimize appropriately. Check out what we do
with siphash:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next.git/tree/include/linux/siphash.h#n76
static inline u64 siphash(const void *data, siz
Hey,
On Thu, Feb 2, 2017 at 7:47 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> I'm wondering whether it has to be that way, especially since it seems to most
> commonly be used on very small input buffers, e.g. 8 or 16-byte blocks.
Note that popular stream ciphers like chacha or salsa wind up XORing
much longer blo
On 4 February 2017 at 21:20, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Hi Ard,
>
> On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 03:56:28PM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> + const int size = sizeof(unsigned long);
>> + int delta = ((unsigned long)dst ^ (unsigned long)src) & (size - 1);
>> + int misalign = 0;
>> +
>> + if (
On Sat, Feb 04, 2017 at 01:20:38PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Unfortunately this is still broken, for two different reasons. First, if the
> pointers have the same relative misalignment, then 'delta' and 'misalign' will
> be set to 0 and long accesses will be used, even though the pointers may
>
Hi Ard,
On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 03:56:28PM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> + const int size = sizeof(unsigned long);
> + int delta = ((unsigned long)dst ^ (unsigned long)src) & (size - 1);
> + int misalign = 0;
> +
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && delta
hi, Matt,
Thanks for your reply.
On 2017/2/4 12:34, Matt Mullins wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 04, 2017 at 11:47:38AM +0800, Yisheng Xie wrote:
>> On 2016/10/18 1:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> hw_random carefully avoids using a stack buffer except in
>>> add_early_randomness(). This causes a crash in vir
