On Tuesday 24 May 2016 02:05 AM, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
On Monday, May 23, 2016 6:14:08 PM CEST Sudip Mukherjee wrote:
We have been getting build warning about:
drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c: In function 'stm32_rng_read':
drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c:82:19: warning: 'sr' may be used
On Tuesday 24 May 2016 02:50 PM, Maxime Coquelin wrote:
2016-05-24 10:58 GMT+02:00 Arnd Bergmann :
On Tuesday, May 24, 2016 10:50:17 AM CEST Maxime Coquelin wrote:
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
index 92a810648bd0..2a0fc90e4dc3 100644
--- a/
In now dm-crypt code, it is ineffective to map one segment (always one
sector) of one bio with just only one scatterlist at one time for hardware
crypto engine. Especially for some encryption mode (like ecb or xts mode)
cooperating with the crypto engine, they just need one initial IV or null
IV in
In dm-crypt, it need to map one bio to scatterlist for improving the
hardware engine encryption efficiency. Thus this patch introduces the
blk_bio_map_sg() function to map one bio with scatterlists.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang
---
block/blk-merge.c | 45
Now some cipher hardware engines prefer to handle bulk block rather than one
sector (512 bytes) created by dm-crypt, cause these cipher engines can handle
the intermediate values (IV) by themselves in one bulk block. This means we
can increase the size of the request by merging request rather than
This patchset will check if the cipher can support bulk mode, then dm-crypt
will handle different ways to send requests to crypto layer according to
cipher mode.
Looking forward to any comments and suggestions. Thanks.
Baolin Wang (3):
block: Introduce blk_bio_map_sg() to map one bio
crypto:
你的小姐妹邀你加Q群：546645595 抢红包。
Hi Stephan,
> > > as I am looking into the RSA countermeasures, I am wondering how much
> of
> > > countermeasures are actually applied inside hardware implementations.
> >
> > Please point me to the reference RSA countermeasures so that we have
> > a common point of start.
>
> As the entire MPI
Am Dienstag, 24. Mai 2016, 16:13:48 schrieb Tudor-Dan Ambarus:
Hi Tudor,
> Hi Stephan,
>
> > > > as I am looking into the RSA countermeasures, I am wondering how much
> >
> > of
> >
> > > > countermeasures are actually applied inside hardware implementations.
> > >
> > > Please point me to th
Am Dienstag, 24. Mai 2016, 09:22:22 schrieb Mat Martineau:
Hi Mat, Herbert
>
> KDF transformations would be extremely useful, but transforming the DH
> output using a KDF needs to be configurable. There are enough different
> uses for DH that it's important to have access to the raw values.
>
>
On Tue, 24 May 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
Am Dienstag, 24. Mai 2016, 08:19:41 schrieb David Howells:
Hi David,
Stephan Mueller wrote:
The KDF patches are fully tested. All that would be needed on the key
retention side after the shared secret generation are the following calls:
kdf = cr
(re-sent in plain text)
Hello!
Tried to boot T5120 with nosmp kernel option, gives OOPS in n2_crypto module:
May 24 13:11:48 nvg5120 kernel: Kernel command line:
root=/dev/mapper/vg1-root ro nosmp
...
May 24 13:11:48 nvg5120 kernel: Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
May 24 13:11:48 nvg5120
Working with kernel 3.12.14, in AEAD mode, I register my crypto driver
and the givencrypt() method in the driver gets called when I send
IPSec traffic. I store the request, and later call its complete()
method from a work queue. There is no actual encryption happening at
the moment, I'm just testin
2016-05-24 12:09 GMT+02:00 Daniel Thompson :
> On 24/05/16 09:50, Maxime Coquelin wrote:
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
>> b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
>> index 92a810648bd0..2a0fc90e4dc3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
>> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_rand
On 24/05/16 09:50, Maxime Coquelin wrote:
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
index 92a810648bd0..2a0fc90e4dc3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ static int stm32_rng_read(str
2016-05-24 10:58 GMT+02:00 Arnd Bergmann :
> On Tuesday, May 24, 2016 10:50:17 AM CEST Maxime Coquelin wrote:
>> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
>> b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
>> index 92a810648bd0..2a0fc90e4dc3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
>> +++ b/dr
On Tuesday, May 24, 2016 10:50:17 AM CEST Maxime Coquelin wrote:
> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
> b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
> index 92a810648bd0..2a0fc90e4dc3 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
> @@ -68,6 +68,10
2016-05-24 10:32 GMT+02:00 Arnd Bergmann :
> On Tuesday, May 24, 2016 9:59:41 AM CEST Maxime Coquelin wrote:
>> 2016-05-23 22:35 GMT+02:00 Arnd Bergmann :
>> > On Monday, May 23, 2016 6:14:08 PM CEST Sudip Mukherjee wrote:
>> >> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
>> >> b/drivers/char/
On Tuesday, May 24, 2016 9:59:41 AM CEST Maxime Coquelin wrote:
> 2016-05-23 22:35 GMT+02:00 Arnd Bergmann :
> > On Monday, May 23, 2016 6:14:08 PM CEST Sudip Mukherjee wrote:
> >> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
> >> b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c
> >> index 92a8106..0533370
2016-05-23 22:35 GMT+02:00 Arnd Bergmann :
> On Monday, May 23, 2016 6:14:08 PM CEST Sudip Mukherjee wrote:
>> We have been getting build warning about:
>> drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c: In function 'stm32_rng_read':
>> drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c:82:19: warning: 'sr' may be used
>>
Am Dienstag, 24. Mai 2016, 08:19:41 schrieb David Howells:
Hi David,
> Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > The KDF patches are fully tested. All that would be needed on the key
> > retention side after the shared secret generation are the following calls:
> >
> > kdf = crypto_alloc_rng(NAME, 0, 0);
> >
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> The KDF patches are fully tested. All that would be needed on the key
> retention side after the shared secret generation are the following calls:
>
> kdf = crypto_alloc_rng(NAME, 0, 0);
>
> crypto_rng_reset(kdf, , sizeof());
>
> crypto_rng_generate(kdf, LABEL, sizeof
Am Dienstag, 24. Mai 2016, 08:04:28 schrieb David Howells:
Hi David,
> Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > With the new DH support for the key retention service, support for DH
> > derived keys pops up.
> >
> > The implementation in security/keys/dh.c returns the DH shared secret
> > straight to the use
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> With the new DH support for the key retention service, support for DH derived
> keys pops up.
>
> The implementation in security/keys/dh.c returns the DH shared secret
> straight
> to the user space caller.
>
> I implemented a KDF with that exact scenario already in
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