Re: [PATCH] kernel crypto API interface specification

2014-10-14 Thread Stephan Mueller
Am Dienstag, 14. Oktober 2014, 21:46:50 schrieb Stephan Mueller: Hi, > The update adds a complete interface documentation of the kernel crypto > API. All cipher types supported by the kernel crypto API are documented. > > In addition, kernel and user space example code is provided. The sample >

[PATCH] crypto: drbg - use crypto_inc

2014-10-14 Thread Stephan Mueller
The DRBG internal buffer addition function is replaced with crypto_inc when a buffer is to be incremented by one. The function drbg_add_buf is moved to the CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH ifdef area as it is now only needed for the Hash DRBG. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller --- crypto/drbg.c | 79 ++

[PATCH] kernel crypto API interface specification

2014-10-14 Thread Stephan Mueller
The update adds a complete interface documentation of the kernel crypto API. All cipher types supported by the kernel crypto API are documented. In addition, kernel and user space example code is provided. The sample code covers synchronous and asynchronous cipher operation, random number generati

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: qat - Enforce valid numa configuration

2014-10-14 Thread Prarit Bhargava
On 10/14/2014 01:27 PM, Prarit Bhargava wrote: > > > On 10/14/2014 01:18 PM, Tadeusz Struk wrote: >> On 10/14/2014 08:41 AM, Prarit Bhargava wrote: >>> Oh, that's a really good point. But can you at least change the message to >>> do a >>> FW_BUG and dump the node information? That would be

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: qat - Enforce valid numa configuration

2014-10-14 Thread Prarit Bhargava
On 10/14/2014 01:18 PM, Tadeusz Struk wrote: > On 10/14/2014 08:41 AM, Prarit Bhargava wrote: >> Oh, that's a really good point. But can you at least change the message to >> do a >> FW_BUG and dump the node information? That would be useful for debugging. > > But this not always will be a FW

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: qat - Enforce valid numa configuration

2014-10-14 Thread Tadeusz Struk
On 10/14/2014 08:41 AM, Prarit Bhargava wrote: > Oh, that's a really good point. But can you at least change the message to > do a > FW_BUG and dump the node information? That would be useful for debugging. But this not always will be a FW_BUG. If a user will not populate one of the nodes with

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: qat - Enforce valid numa configuration

2014-10-14 Thread Prarit Bhargava
On 10/14/2014 10:50 AM, Tadeusz Struk wrote: > On 10/14/2014 03:53 AM, Prarit Bhargava wrote: >>> >>> - node = adf_get_dev_node_id(pdev); >>> - accel_dev = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*accel_dev), GFP_KERNEL, node); >>> + if (num_possible_nodes() > 1 && dev_to_node(&pdev->dev) < 0) { >>> +

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: qat - Enforce valid numa configuration

2014-10-14 Thread Tadeusz Struk
On 10/14/2014 03:53 AM, Prarit Bhargava wrote: >> >> -node = adf_get_dev_node_id(pdev); >> -accel_dev = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*accel_dev), GFP_KERNEL, node); >> +if (num_possible_nodes() > 1 && dev_to_node(&pdev->dev) < 0) { >> +/* If the accelerator is connected to a node wit

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: qat - Enforce valid numa configuration

2014-10-14 Thread Prarit Bhargava
On 10/13/2014 09:24 PM, Tadeusz Struk wrote: > > - node = adf_get_dev_node_id(pdev); > - accel_dev = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*accel_dev), GFP_KERNEL, node); > + if (num_possible_nodes() > 1 && dev_to_node(&pdev->dev) < 0) { > + /* If the accelerator is connected to a node w

[PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - add support for rfc4106(gcm(aes))

2014-10-14 Thread Tudor Ambarus
Add Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) as an IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) mechanism to provide confidentiality and data origin authentication. Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 423 -

[PATCH v2 1/2] crypto: caam - add support for gcm(aes)

2014-10-14 Thread Tudor Ambarus
Add support for AES working in Galois Counter Mode. There is a limitation related to IV size, similar to the one present in SW implementation (crypto/gcm.c): The only IV size allowed is 12 bytes. It will be padded by HW to the right with 0x_0001 (up to 16 bytes - AES block size), according to

[GIT PULL] LLVMLinux patches for v3.18

2014-10-14 Thread Behan Webster
These patches remove the use of VLAIS using a new SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK macro. Some of the previously accepted VLAIS removal patches haven't used this macro. I will push new patches to consistently use this macro in all those older cases for 3.19 The following changes since commit 2d65a9f48fcdf7866a