Acked-by: Ruchika Gupta
> -Original Message-
> From: Nitesh Lal [mailto:niteshnarayan...@freescale.com]
> Sent: Friday, March 07, 2014 4:06 PM
> To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; Gupta Ruchika-R66431; Dutta Yashpal-
> B05456; herb...@gondor.apana.org
> Cc: Lal Nitesh-B44382
> Subject: [PA
This patch allocates memory from DMAable region to the caam_rng_ctx object,
earlier it had been statically allocated which resulted in errorneous
behaviour on inserting the caamrng module at the runtime.
Signed-off-by: Nitesh Lal
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 15 +--
1 file cha
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 03:51:48PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
> to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
> as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
> per-boot differences.
On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:52:27PM -0600, Matt Mackall wrote:
> On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 16:11 -0500, Jason Cooper wrote:
> > > In other words, if there are 4096 bits of "unknownness" in X to start
> > > with, and I can get those same 4096 bits of "unknownness" back by
> > > unmixing X' and Y, then th
