On Fri, 9 Sep 2011, Steve Grubb wrote:
> But what I was trying to say is that we can't depend on these supplemental
> hardware
> devices like TPM because we don't have access to the proprietary technical
> details
> that would be necessary to supplement the analysis. And when it comes to TPM
>
Include to pick up the declarations for crypto_aes_encrypt_x86
and crypto_aes_decrypt_x86 to quiet the sparse noise:
warning: symbol 'crypto_aes_encrypt_x86' was not declared. Should it be static?
warning: symbol 'crypto_aes_decrypt_x86' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: H Ha
On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 03:08:03PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 12:13 PM, David Miller wrote:
> > From: Steve Grubb
>
> >> This patch does not _break_ all existing applications. If a system were
> >> under attack,
> >> they might pause momentarily, but they do not break. Pl
On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 12:13 PM, David Miller wrote:
> From: Steve Grubb
>> This patch does not _break_ all existing applications. If a system were
>> under attack,
>> they might pause momentarily, but they do not break. Please, try the patch
>> and use a
>> nice large number like 200 and
On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 09:04:17AM -0400, Steve Grubb wrote: But what
> I was trying to say is that we can't depend on these supplemental
> hardware devices like TPM because we don't have access to the
> proprietary technical details that would be necessary to supplement
> the analysis. And when it
On Thursday, September 08, 2011 10:21:13 PM Sandy Harris wrote:
> > The system being low on entropy is another problem that should be
> > addressed. For our purposes, we cannot say take it from TPM or RDRND or
> > any plugin board. We have to have the mathematical analysis that goes
> > with it, we
