On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 10:57:55AM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Accepted by whom?
> We extend functionality of Integrity subsystem in order to support
> flashable images which can be verified with public keys...
Whoever that's going to merge the use-case for this :)
I'm not adding a w
Hi,
Accepted by whom?
We extend functionality of Integrity subsystem in order to support
flashable images which can be verified with public keys...
- Dmitry
On 22/03/11 09:34, ext Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 08:59:56AM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> As I have said in my email t
On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 02:10:13PM +0800, brill...@viatech.com.cn wrote:
> Add new SHA-1/256 module that never needs any fallback and just calls
> the
> PadLock hardware instruction supported from VIA Nano processors to
> implement
> the "update" and "final" function.
> They are respectively named
On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 08:59:56AM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>
> As I have said in my email that it will be used by IMA/EVM subsystem.
> See security/integrity subdirectory in Linux kernel...
Has the use of software asymmetric crypto in the kernel been
accepted for that purpose?
Thanks,
--
To elaborate a bit.
Signing of some has is usually done instead of signing some input data
directly.
For that reason signature verification is basically a combination of
hash calculation with signature verification...
The issue here is that different padding schemes can be applied to the
has befor
Hi,
As I have said in my email that it will be used by IMA/EVM subsystem.
See security/integrity subdirectory in Linux kernel...
Indeed, use of HW accelerator is also on of the targets...
- Dmitry
On 21/03/11 16:06, ext Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 04:04:41PM +0200, Dmitry Kasa
