On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 12:03:43PM -0400, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 11:54:09AM -0400, Santiago Torres Arias wrote:
> > > Seeing how large this signature is, I have to admit that I am partial to
> > > Konstantin's suggestion of using minisign.
> Seeing how large this signature is, I have to admit that I am partial to
> Konstantin's suggestion of using minisign. This seems like something
> that could be added to git as an alternative to gpg without too much
> trouble, I think.
>
>
I wonder how big the pgp payload would be with ed25519
cover the new content
> and to have a
> way to verify every step.
> Moreover you won't be able to reparent the commit as a maintainer (wich
> I think is
> also a deal-breaker)
For reference, we did something similar here[1]. I'll acknowledge it's
somewhat of a niche us
ly that you have a stable way to refer to
> > a patch or commit (despite it appearing on a mailing list), and there
> > is no need for "changeset IDs" or whatever, since you can just use the
> > git SHA1 which is unique, unambiguous, and stable.
I wonder if it'd be also possible to then embed gpg signatures over
send-mail payloads so as they can be transparently transferred to the
commit.
-Santiago
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
compare revisions *and* paths. I see that if I do
git diff -- [TAB]
I get all the paths as an autocomplete option, which I think is desired
behavior.
Thanks,
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
Hi,
I'm not completely sure if this is the best way to achieve this, but I
you could instruct a merge driver to mark all new files as unset.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 04:42:48PM +0300, Ilya Kantor wrote:
> Hi,
>
> We're using Git to manage translations of
verify_tag_options);
> > - }
>
> This leaves us with a weird doubled conditional (with no braces
> either!). Maybe:
>
> if (format.format && verify_ref_format(&format))
> usage_with_options(...);
>
> ?
Yes, I think chaining this if here is cleaner/less error prone.
>
> Other than that, the patch looks good. I think it could use a test in
> t7030, though.
Let me make a re-roll with these changes included and a test suite for
both t7030 or t7004.
Thanks!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
I'll add a patch to the series with a test for this.
Thanks for the review!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
From: Santiago Torres
The current implementation of git-verify-tag omits the gpg output when
the --format flag is passed. This may not be useful to users that want
to see the gpg output *and* --format the output of git verify-tag.
Instead, respect the --raw flag or the default gpg output
From: Santiago Torres
The current implementation of git tag -v omits the gpg output when the
--format flag is passed. This may not be useful to users that want to
see the gpg output *and* --format the output of the git tag -v. Instead,
pass the default gpg interface output if --format is
From: Santiago Torres
The default behavior of the tag verification functions used to quiet
down the gpg output if --format was passed. The rationale for this was
to avoid --format to be litterred by the gpg output. However, this may
be unnecessary because the gpg output is already streamed to
On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:07:01PM +, brian m. carlson wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 12:02:11PM -0400, Jeff King wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:46:56AM -0400, Santiago Torres Arias wrote:
> >
> > > I think that would be great, as we could make it simpler for
On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:28:42AM -0400, Jeff King wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 10:52:38AM -0400, Santiago Torres Arias wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is the second what's cooking that's gone by without mention of the
> > RFC patch regarding verify_tag[1].
t specifier, similar to the way "log
> --format=%G?" works.
I think that would be great, as we could make it simpler for verifiers
to parse gpg output.
> So I think ultimately that's the direction we want to go, but I think
> in the meantime restoring the gpg output to stderr especially for the
> porcelain "git tag -v" makes sense for human eyes.
Great! let me re-roll and make a more formal take on this.
Thanks!
-Santiago
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
the
RFC patch regarding verify_tag[1]. Is this due to lack of interest or is
this an error on my side (f.e., did I forget to send something?).
Thanks!
-Santiago
[1]
https://public-inbox.org/git/20190412201609.hivppg2l37b6pzze@LykOS.localdomain/
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 04:14:32PM -0400, santi...@nyu.edu wrote:
> From: Santiago Torres
>
> On the git tag -v code, there is a guard to suppress gpg output if a
> pretty format is provided. The rationale for this is that the gpg output
> *and* the pretty formats together may con
From: Santiago Torres
On the git tag -v code, there is a guard to suppress gpg output if a
pretty format is provided. The rationale for this is that the gpg output
*and* the pretty formats together may conflict with each other. However,
both outputs are directed to different output streams and
], and there's some
stalled work into implementing this using push certificates...
Thanks,
-Santiago.
[1] https://public-inbox.org/git/xmqqk2hzldx8@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com/
[2] https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/pacman-dev/2017-September/022123.html
[3]
https://www.usenix.org/confe
s about it somewhere? :))
Cheers!
-Santiago.
On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 09:19:58PM +0100, Fabio Aiuto wrote:
> Yes that's great.
> Why somebody told me about a outdate toolchain when I started this
> little thread about first git compiling? Sorry for my stupid question
> but the you j
is
sometimes distracting.
Good luck!
-Santiago.
On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 09:19:52PM +0100, Fabio Aiuto wrote:
> What a pity, It would have been very useful for me, to debug around
> that simple version, to understand how everithing works.
> Thank you Santiago.
> Fabio.
> Il giorno
e openssl 1.0.0
series anymore.
Thanks,
-Santiago.
On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 08:58:37PM +0100, Fabio Aiuto wrote:
> Hi to all,
>
> I'm trying to build first commit of git made by Linus. I mean the one
> named e83c5163316f89bfbde7d9ab23... (I think this is enough).
> But at buildi
Awesome,
Do consider reading the files under Documentation (as other people
suggested) to make it easier to contribute. There's CodingGuidelines
and SubmittingPatches that are super useful :)
Good luck!
-Santiago.
On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 10:43:13PM +0100, Fabio Aiuto wrote:
> Ok I ty
It'd be difficult to debug without more context:
Do you mind sharing your build log and more informationa about your
setup? (e.g., what OS are you running, what packages are installed, how
did you get the git sources, etc.)
Thanks,
-Santiago.
On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 10:56:54PM +0100,
Hi, Ralph.
This feels like an issue of how homebrew relays information rather than
with git:
santiago at ~ ✔ git clone nonexistent
fatal: repository 'nonexistent' does not exist
santiago at ~ ✗ git clone https://nonexistent.git
Cloning into 'nonexistent'...
> > disable fetching keys from hkp servers. This way signature verification
> > should fail.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > -Santiago.
>
> This is not a deviation. GPG correctly recognizes difference between trusted,
> untrusted and unknown levels. git on the other ha
Tooling around gpg is generally
difficult for this reason, but using the raw output should be enough to
discard signatures with untrusted keys.
Another alternative is to use a keyring with trusted keys *only* and
disable fetching keys from hkp servers. This way signature verification
should fail.
part of every repository (e.g., hold them under
/usr/share/git/samples/hooks/ or something along those lines).
> I also wish hooks were just shell snippets in the config files that
> could follow the usual config-precedence rules.
I like this idea, but I'd probably keep the snippets in a separate file
to keep things clean.
Thanks,
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
or your
solaris version are the ones (possibly) packaging 2.3.1. I'd email or
open a ticket with Oracle after making sure they 1) haven't backported
patches to fix these, or 2) don't have a newer version in their
repositories.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
[1] https://security.archlinux.
o be very very
> welcome.
I agree. I personally think that at least the sample hook work on here
would be a good candidate for this[1], although I don't know what's the
status of it. The way they are right now, they should at least warn when
push certificates are not enabled on the se
my very opinionated take on it.
Full disclosure, I published a "competing" solution a couple of years
ago[1] but, in my personal opinion, I think push certificates can
achieve the same security guarantees as my system with very little
changes.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
[1]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/torres-arias
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
it
evtags already.
Thanks,
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
h a signed data structure with relevant git
reference information as a git object to avoid a server/mitm from moving
references around.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
[1]
https://public-inbox.org/git/1408485987-3590-1-git-send-email-gits...@pobox.com/
[2] https://public-inbox.org/git/20171202091248.6037-1-r...@shikhe
embedded in it. I wonder if, with the current
tooling in git, this could be done as a custom command...
Cheers!
-Santiago.
On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 03:12:00PM -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
> Hi, so quite a while ago I wrote this:
> https://github.com/cgwalters/git-evtag
>
> Since I last poste
Ah, my bad. I missed this patch...
Good luck!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
eem like status should be one of those
> cases.
I think it's because of the reasons above. That being said, I don't know
what the rest of the community would think of something akin to a
--no-update-index type flag.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
hanks,
-Santiago
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
d definitely not litter the stdout with ENOENT-like
error messages though...
Thanks again for catching this!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
Quick followup.
The version that triggers this is at least 2.1.21[1]. I recall there was some
wiggle room on minor versions before it.
Thanks!
-Santiago.
[1] https://dev.gnupg.org/T3218
On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 06:02:02PM -0500, Santiago Torres wrote:
>
> > Were the ENOENT e
l to gpgconf. If that worked
> across the various gnupg 2.x releases, it would be a simple enough change to
> make as a follow-up.
Let me dig up the exact versions. IIRC it was somewhere between 2.1.0 and 2.2.x
or so. I think somewhere within the patch re-rolls I had the exact versions.
for scdaemon only).
Thanks again!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
It'd be helpful to know:
- What did you do?
- What did you expect to happen?
- What happened instead?
I suspect you are using --patch with a new file, so you probably need to first
add it with -N or so. This is just a shot in the dark though...
Thanks,
-Santiago.
On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at
e these four behaviors:
[santiago@LykOS bg_daemon]$ git ls-tree -d HEAD -- src
04 tree 238a62ca62527423fd3190d00917ddfef0d254a3src
[santiago@LykOS bg_daemon]$ git ls-tree -d HEAD -- src/
04 tree 767beaaf0927f89e630c52830b6fbac138ec039asrc/bg_daemon
[santiago@LykOS bg_daemon]$
to the latest push certificate would make it easier to
handle/tool/sync around the push certificate solution?
Thanks,
-Santiago.
[1]
https://public-inbox.org/git/CAJo=hJvWbjEM9E5AjPHgmQ=eY8xf=Q=xtukeu2ur7auuqea...@mail.gmail.com/
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
ed: secret key not available
This feels like an issue with the interface to the key itself. Can you
start a non-detached agent with --verbose to see exactly where it blows up?
We probably want to continue this offlist as this seems more of a gpg
issue rather than git. We can always come back if we figure out this is
something git related :)
Cheers!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
ps or things I can do are welcome.
> t5551 seems to be flaky - from time to time.
> It seems that I have it reproducable unstable, so if someone has more
> ideas, please.
I'm still unable to reproduce. Do you think you can enable GIT_TRACE,
GIT_TRACE_PACK and GIT_TRACE_CURL and pastebin/paste what you see?
Cheers!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
ens if you kill the apache processes?
I can't reproduce on my side, but let me see if I can dig a little into
it.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
From: Santiago Torres
When running gpg-relevant tests, a gpg-daemon is spawned for each
GNUPGHOME used. This daemon may stay running after the test and cache
file descriptors for the trash directories, even after the trash
directory is removed. This leads to ENOENT errors when attempting to
> With that "run it but ignore the outcome even if we failed to.", we
> do not have to worry about any of that ;-)
Oh right! thanks for the suggestion! Let me re-roll...
Thanks,
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
opefully gpgconf goes
nowhere by then).
I was able to test this on debian oldstable/stable and arch.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
[1] https://public-inbox.org/git/xmqqvampmnmv@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com/
On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 12:58:14PM -0400, santi...@nyu.edu wrote:
> From: Santiago Torres
From: Santiago Torres
When running gpg-relevant tests, a gpg-daemon is spawned for each
GNUPGHOME used. This daemon may stay running after the test and cache
file descriptors for the trash directories, even after the trash
directory is removed. This leads to ENOENT errors when attempting to
tch/Arch, who do ship gpg2 with
gpgconf. It seems Debian oldstable and other variants still ship gpg1,
which doesn't have it. Would it make sense to have a fallthrough branch
on the switch statement for gpg2.1 instead? something like the attached patch.
Thanks,
-Santiago.
From 07ab87c1ddb3119
is clearly understood and
> documented.
I double checked the patch/solutions/causes just to be sure I'm not
doing anything crazy. Here's a v2 of the patch that kills the agent upon
cleanup rather than startup.
Thanks!
-Santiago.
From 20491890b804d13f9edb0205c1cc21d080beffe2 Mon Sep
and would leave an agent
instance per test running, possibly forever. E.g., make test would
result in the following:
santiago at ~ ✔ pgrep -a gpg-agent
632 gpg-agent --homedir /git/t/trash directory.t6050-replace/gpghome
--use-standard-socket --daemon
1192 /usr/bin/gpg-agent --supe
GPG_AGENT_INFO SSH_AUTH_SOCK etc. into the list of
> envirionment variables to nuke there?
>
> Combined with the unknown-ness of the root cause of the issue, I can
> only say that the patch may be raising an issue worth addressing,
> but it is too sketchy to tell if it is a right solution or what the
> exact problem being solved is.
I'll dig into this. This sounds a way more reasonable approach.
Thanks for the feedback!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
elopment lately. I checked the latest iterations of "what's
cooking" to see if it was going to be discarded or so, but I see no
mention of it.
Thanks!
-Santiago
[1]
https://public-inbox.org/git/20170707220729.a3xrsju3rf4guyzs@LykOS.localdomain/T/#t
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
Hello all,
I don't know if this is a desired feature, but I noticed that, one some
versions of gpg, gpg tests are skipped when I run a test suite multiple
times.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
On Fri, Jul 07, 2017 at 06:01:59PM -0400, santi...@nyu.edu wrote:
> From: Santiago Torres
>
> Wh
From: Santiago Torres
When running gpg-relevant tests, a gpg-daemon is ran for a
trash_directory-specific GNUPGHOME. This daemon creates a unix socket on
the target host, and it will be used on subsequent runs of the same test
script. Add a call to kill the agent and flush the sockets of the
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 03:00:08PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> Santiago Torres writes:
> OK, so has everybody agreed what the next step would be?
I believe it is, although I imagine getting a confirmation from Peff
would be adequate.
> Is the patch below a good first step (I stil
uot;ignored unless %(gpg) formatters
> are used". Which would be backwards-compatible and safe for old formats,
> and work correctly for new ones.
This sounds like a helpful addition to implement. We could update/add
tests for compliance on this once the feature is addded and fix the
ambiguo
e current
> behavior, the bogus ones are quietly omitted. Which can also be
> confusing, but I'd think would generally err on the side of caution.
In that case, something like this would be closer to the desired
behavior?
I'm also unsure on what would be the right thing to put on the co
gt;> t/t7004-tag.sh| 8
> >> t/t7030-verify-tag.sh | 8
> >> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > Like 2/3, this one also produces test failures for me. It looks like
> > "verify-tag" does not show a tag
ilures for me. It looks like
> "verify-tag" does not show a tag which has been forged. I'm not sure if
> that's intentional (and the test is wrong) or a bug.
I see that offending code would be [1]. Changing this behavior should be
trivial (dropping the continue), although I
together. I think Arstechnica may be a little bit
sensationalistic here.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
[1] https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=168774#c27
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
Hello all,
I ran into this website presenting the "first practical attack on
sha1"[1]. I don't recall seeing this on the ML, so I'm sharing this just
in case. I know there are proposals to move out of sha1 already. I
wonder if this affects the timeline for their adoption?
Th
could be implemented by tools like this rather easily
(e.g., using symlinks + inotify or something less hacky).
I'm wondering if standardizing this would be more interesting to those
communities?
I would like to see what becomes of this.
Cheers!
-Santiago.
On Tue, Feb 07, 2017 at 08:32
git clone --recursive https://github.com/...
$ ls
Thanks,
-Santiago
On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 05:58:58PM +0100, Jordi Durban wrote:
> Hi all! Not sure if that will reach the goal, but let's it a try.
>
> I have a problem with the git clone command: when I try to clone a remote
>
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 10:44:03AM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> Santiago Torres writes:
>
Was:
Thanks!
Would you want me to re-roll really quick? or would you rather apply
this on your side?
Thanks,
-Santiago.
>
> Eric, I've noticed that this message
>
>
> h
e updated.
>
> Squashing the following into this commit solves this issue with the
> former approach. The lines it touches are all from 4/6 and I view
> all of it as general improvement, including type correctness and
> code formatting.
Thanks!
Should I re-roll this really quick? Or would you rather apply this on
your tree directly?
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
From: Lukas Puehringer
ref-filter functions are useful for printing git object information
using a format specifier. However, some other modules may not want to use
this functionality on a ref-array but only print a single item.
Expose a pretty_print_ref function to create, pretty print and free
From: Santiago Torres
tag -v now supports --format specifiers to inspect the contents of a tag
upon verification. Add two tests to ensure this behavior is respected in
future changes.
Signed-off-by: Santiago Torres
---
t/t7004-tag.sh | 16
1 file changed, 16 insertions
From: Santiago Torres
Verify-tag now provides --format specifiers to inspect and ensure the
contents of the tag are proper. We add two tests to ensure this
functionality works as expected: the return value should indicate if
verification passed, and the format specifiers must be respected
From: Lukas Puehringer
Adding --format to git tag -v mutes the default output of the GPG
verification and instead prints the formatted tag object.
This allows callers to cross-check the tagname from refs/tags with
the tagname from the tag object header upon GPG verification.
The callback functio
From: Santiago Torres
Callers of verify-tag may want to cross-check the tagname from refs/tags
with the tagname from the tag object header upon GPG verification. This
is to avoid tag refs that point to an incorrect object.
Add a --format parameter to git verify-tag to print the formatted tag
From: Lukas Puehringer
Functions that print git object information may require that the
gpg-interface functions be silent. Add GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS flag and
prevent print_signature_buffer from being called if flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Puehringer
---
gpg-interface.h | 5 +++--
tag.c
From: Santiago Torres
This is the sixth iteration of [1][2][3][4][5], and as a result of the
discussion in [5]. The main goal of this patch series is to bring
--format to git tag verification so that upper-layer tools can inspect
the content of a tag and make decisions based on it.
In this re
> VERBOSE|QUIET _does_ have a meaning, which is "show the payload, but do
> not print the signature buffer". Perhaps just renaming QUIET to
> OMIT_STATUS or something would make it more clear.
>
Let me give this a go too. OMIT_STATUS does sound less confusing.
Thank
Yeah, this actually looks more cleaner.
Let me give it a go.
Thanks!
-Santiago.
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 12:30:04PM -0500, Jeff King wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 12:25:31PM -0500, Jeff King wrote:
>
> > Actually, looking at the callsites, I think they are fine
(GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE will be unset when GPG_VERIFY_QUIET). I
would have to re-read the patch to make sure this is the case then.
GPG_VERIFY_QUIET was added to suppress any VERBOSE|RAW flags, we could
defeault to QUIET if flags are not set. What do you think?
Thanks!
-Santiago
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
)
run_gpg_verification()
I'm afraid that adding yet another wrapper would further convolute the
call chain. If you think this is not an issue, I could easily do it. Do
you have any suggested name for the wrapper?
Thanks!
-Santiago
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
From: Lukas Puehringer
Calling functions for gpg_verify_tag() may desire to print relevant
information about the header for further verification. Add an optional
format argument to print any desired information after GPG verification.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Puehringer
---
builtin/tag.c|
From: Santiago Torres
Callers of verify-tag may want to cross-check the tagname from refs/tags
with the tagname from the tag object header upon GPG verification. This
is to avoid tag refs that point to an incorrect object.
Add a --format parameter to git verify-tag to print the formatted tag
From: Santiago Torres
This is the fifth iteration of [1][2][3][4], and as a result of the
discussion in [5]. The main goal of this patch series is to bring
--format to git tag verification so that upper-layer tools can inspect
the content of a tag and make decisions based on it.
In this re-woll
From: Lukas Puehringer
Functions that print git object information may require that the
gpg-interface functions be silent. Add GPG_VERIFY_QUIET flag and prevent
print_signature_buffer from being called if flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Puehringer
---
gpg-interface.h | 1 +
tag.c |
From: Santiago Torres
Verify-tag now provides --format specifiers to inspect and ensure the
contents of the tag are proper. We add two tests to ensure this
functionality works as expected: the return value should indicate if
verification passed, and the format specifiers must be respected
From: Santiago Torres
tag -v now supports --format specifiers to inspect the contents of a tag
upon verification. Add two tests to ensure this behavior is respected in
future changes.
Signed-off-by: Santiago Torres
---
t/t7004-tag.sh | 16
1 file changed, 16 insertions
From: Lukas Puehringer
ref-filter functions are useful for printing git object information
using a format specifier. However, some other modules may not want to use
this functionality on a ref-array but only print a single item.
Expose a pretty_print_ref function to create, pretty print and free
From: Lukas Puehringer
Adding --format to git tag -v mutes the default output of the GPG
verification and instead prints the formatted tag object.
This allows callers to cross-check the tagname from refs/tags with
the tagname from the tag object header upon GPG verification.
The callback functio
On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 04:39:44PM -0400, Jeff King wrote:
> The ref-filter code generally expects to see fully qualified
> refs, so that things like "%(refname)" and "%(refname:short)"
> work as expected. We can do so easily from git-tag, which
> always works with refnames in the refs/tags namespa
and you can use
> "%(refname:short)" if you want the shorter part).
Hmm, I hadn't actually noticed that. Do you have any suggestions in how to
address this?
In general this feels like a consequence of disambiguating .git/tags/*
within builtin/tag.c rather than letting ref-filter figure it out.
Thanks,
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
t; Is this ready for 'next'?
Hi, I saw this on the previous "what's cooking." Is there anything I
need to do on my side to make sure this is ready for next?
Thanks!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
Hi,
I noticed there were no replies for this thread. I was curious if it got
buried because I sent it on the Friday evening before a long weekend.
I don't mean to pressure or anything.
Thanks!
-Santiago.
On Fri, Oct 07, 2016 at 05:07:14PM -0400, santi...@nyu.edu wrote:
> From: Santiag
From: Santiago Torres
Verify-tag now provides --format specifiers to inspect and ensure the
contents of the tag are proper. We add two tests to ensure this
functionality works as expected: the return value should indicate if
verification passed, and the format specifiers must be respected
From: Lukas Puehringer
Adding --format to git tag -v mutes the default output of the GPG
verification and instead prints the formatted tag object.
This allows callers to cross-check the tagname from refs/tags with
the tagname from the tag object header upon GPG verification.
The callback functio
From: Santiago Torres
tag -v now supports --format specifiers to inspect the contents of a tag
upon verification. Add two tests to ensure this behavior is respected in
future changes.
Signed-off-by: Santiago Torres
---
t/t7004-tag.sh | 16
1 file changed, 16 insertions
From: Santiago Torres
This is the fourth iteration of the series in [1][2][3], which comes as a
result of the discussion in [4]. The main goal of this patch series is to bring
--format to git tag verification so that upper-layer tools can inspect the
content of a tag and make decisions based on
From: Lukas Puehringer
Functions that print git object information may require that the
gpg-interface functions be silent. Add GPG_VERIFY_QUIET flag and prevent
print_signature_buffer from being called if flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Puehringer
---
gpg-interface.h | 1 +
tag.c |
From: Lukas Puehringer
ref-filter functions are useful for printing git object information
using a format specifier. However, some other modules may not want to use
this functionality on a ref-array but only print a single item.
Expose a pretty_print_ref function to create, pretty print and free
From: Lukas Puehringer
Calling functions for gpg_verify_tag() may desire to print relevant
information about the header for further verification. Add an optional
format argument to print any desired information after GPG verification.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Puehringer
---
builtin/tag.c|
From: Santiago Torres
Callers of verify-tag may want to cross-check the tagname from refs/tags
with the tagname from the tag object header upon GPG verification. This
is to avoid tag refs that point to an incorrect object.
Add a --format parameter to git verify-tag to print the formatted tag
cial attention to?
(I'm looking at t7004 mostly right now).
Thanks!
-Santiago.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
1 - 100 of 217 matches
Mail list logo