On Wednesday 25 June 2008, Jason Rivard wrote:
> Wait for my private mail, Mr. Walters.
I wouldn't bother with a private mail Jason. Tomorrow Chris will calm
down, take a deep breath and probably contribute to the list again. It
pretty much always works that way.
Maybe he's quick to anger. Wel
"Jason Rivard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> at Wednesday 25 June 2008, 23:53:23
> > > The only thing that cryptography attempts to do is reduce the
> > > **probability** of cracking the key and gaining access to the data as
> > > low as possible.
> >
> > No news. That's, why cryptology defines "security" n
On Wed, Jun 25, 2008 at 9:51 PM, Chris Walters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Alan McKinnon wrote:
>
>> Or perhaps you doubt that they can crack any keys at all...
>>>
>>
>> Don't get smart with me, jackass.
>>
>
> Fuck off, shitehead. Call me a jackass, when I simply state facts you
> admitted to?
On Wed, Jun 25, 2008 at 9:24 PM, Sebastian Wiesner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
> Chris Walters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> at Wednesday 25 June 2008, 22:25:18
> > Are you a cryptology expert?
>
> Are you then?
I doubt that either of you are cryptology experts. I've known a few, and I
am a crypto-expert
Alan McKinnon wrote:
Or
perhaps you doubt that they can crack any keys at all...
Don't get smart with me, jackass.
Fuck off, shitehead. Call me a jackass, when I simply state facts you admitted
to? You're a fucking idiot. Welcome to my ignore list.
--
gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org mailin
On Wednesday 25 June 2008, Chris Walters wrote:
> | This is the point where I start to ask for a citation and stop
> | listening to theoretical possibilities and things that might
> | possibly could be. Unless of course the exact meaning of phrases
> | like "three hundred thousand million years" ha
Chris Walters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> at Wednesday 25 June 2008, 22:25:18
> Are you a cryptology expert?
Are you then?
> The only thing that cryptography attempts to do is reduce the
> **probability** of cracking the key and gaining access to the data as low
> as possible.
No news. That's, why
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Alan McKinnon wrote:
| On Wednesday 25 June 2008, Chris Walters wrote:
|> Dirk Heinrichs wrote:
|> | If it is so easy for them to crack our ciphers (and the one they
|> | use themselves, btw.), why doesn't Kasperky ask them to crack the
|> | key of
On Wednesday 25 June 2008, Chris Walters wrote:
> Dirk Heinrichs wrote:
> | If it is so easy for them to crack our ciphers (and the one they
> | use themselves, btw.), why doesn't Kasperky ask them to crack the
> | key of the GPCode virus which, according to Kaspersky's
> | assumptions, would keep
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Dirk Heinrichs wrote:
| If it is so easy for them to crack our ciphers (and the one they use
| themselves, btw.), why doesn't Kasperky ask them to crack the key of the
| GPCode virus which, according to Kaspersky's assumptions, would keep 15
| milli
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Sebastian Wiesner wrote:
| Chris Walters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> at Wednesday 25 June 2008, 17:14:20
|
|> | Rumor has it that the three-letter agencies (CIA, KGB, M.A.V.O. [2],
|> | etc) can break those algorithms relatively easy. On the other hand even
On Wednesday 25 June 2008, Dirk Heinrichs wrote:
> If it is so easy for them to crack our ciphers (and the one they use
> themselves, btw.), why doesn't Kasperky ask them to crack the key of
> the GPCode virus which, according to Kaspersky's assumptions, would
> keep 15 million modern PCs busy for
Chris Walters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> at Wednesday 25 June 2008, 17:14:20
> | Rumor has it that the three-letter agencies (CIA, KGB, M.A.V.O. [2],
> | etc) can break those algorithms relatively easy. On the other hand even
> | weaker algorithms can protect your data against laptop thieves.
You had be
Am Mittwoch, 25. Juni 2008 schrieb Chris Walters:
> | Rumor has it that the three-letter agencies (CIA, KGB, M.A.V.O. [2],
> | etc) can break those algorithms relatively easy. On the other hand even
> | weaker algorithms can protect your data against laptop thieves.
>
> That's more than a rumor.
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Daniel Iliev wrote:
| On Tue, 24 Jun 2008 22:20:20 -0400
| Chris Walters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
| Perhaps they appear as kernel modules? I'm just guessing.
I think that is how they are supposed to appear, but I can't seem to get them
to
On Tue, 24 Jun 2008 22:20:20 -0400
Chris Walters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
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>
> Thanks to all who replied to my previous question. This question is
> related. Has anyone gotten the 'extra-ciphers' (you can get them from
> the loop-aes site) to
Am Mittwoch, 25. Juni 2008 schrieb ext Chris Walters:
> Also, someone said that it was possible to encrypt using multiple
> passphrases using dm-crypt.
That was me. To be correct: I wrote that with LUKS (which is based on
dm-crypt) it is possible to use multiple keys (a key may be a passphrase o
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Thanks to all who replied to my previous question. This question is related.
Has anyone gotten the 'extra-ciphers' (you can get them from the loop-aes site)
to compile with the loop-aes kernel patch in place? If so, could you give me a
hint on how
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