Christopher Head wrote:
>
> Are you sure that said utility isn't simply chown --from=?
As usual, I just checked the POSIX standard and not the
GNU extensions before posting ;)
I did now a quick audit of the coreutils-8.25 source:
It seems to be safely implemented in the way I mentioned.
On 02/04/2017 03:50 AM, Christopher Head wrote:
>>
>> Not a bad idea... we chould ship that safe-chown utility, and then
>> tell users how to use it to fix their UIDs. The draft that I wrote up
>> was for the "fixed UID with random fallback" model, but said utility
>> could still be useful for peop
On Fri, 3 Feb 2017 14:29:04 -0500
Michael Orlitzky wrote:
> > However, it is no rocket science to write a race-free chown command
> > in C: Just open the file and use stat() and fchown() to be sure to
> > change only files from the "correct" user.
> >
> > Since this works on the filehandle and n
On 02/03/2017 09:51 AM, Martin Vaeth wrote:
> Michael Orlitzky wrote:
>>
>> The fact that all permission and ownership information is shared is
>> precisely the problem. When you change ownership of the hardlink (which
>> you'll never know is a hardlink), you change ownership of /etc/shadow.
>
>
Michael Orlitzky wrote:
>
> The fact that all permission and ownership information is shared is
> precisely the problem. When you change ownership of the hardlink (which
> you'll never know is a hardlink), you change ownership of /etc/shadow.
Why should this be a problem except for a race between
Rich Freeman posted on Fri, 27 Jan 2017 16:23:02 -0500 as excerpted:
> On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 3:09 PM, Michael Orlitzky
> wrote:
>> My first impression is that any package that doesn't care about its UID
>> should default to "first available", but if that causes problems, then
>> that's exactly
