RE: [PATCH] [i386] Enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

2017-06-21 Thread Bernhard Reutner-Fischer
On 21 June 2017 16:07:29 CEST, "Tsimbalist, Igor V" wrote: >Thanks for the feedback. I'll redo the patch according to your >comments. what is "noni-tracking" ? Surplus i. "codegeneration" probably lacks a space. Thanks,

RE: [PATCH] [i386] Enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

2017-06-21 Thread Tsimbalist, Igor V
[i386] Enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). Importance: High This patch is completely missing documentation (in *.texi files) of the new options, attribute, built-in functions etc. You appear to be adding quite target-specific things to the architecture-independent compiler. I

Re: [PATCH] [i386] Enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

2017-06-20 Thread Joseph Myers
This patch is completely missing documentation (in *.texi files) of the new options, attribute, built-in functions etc. You appear to be adding quite target-specific things to the architecture-independent compiler. If the attribute, for example, is to be architecture-independent, the documenta

[PATCH] [i386] Enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

2017-06-20 Thread Tsimbalist, Igor V
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides the following capabilities to defend against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks: - Shadow Stack - return address protection to defend against Return   Oriented Programming, - Indirect branch tracking - free branch protection to defend