--- Comment #31 from andreas at andreas dot org 2007-01-21 12:23 ---
And who will go over the existing millions lines of code, and verify the
overflow checks everywhere? Or add -fwrapv to all the Makefiles for unaidited
code? Obviously not you. It seems to be easier to pretend you&#x
--- Comment #32 from andreas at andreas dot org 2007-01-21 12:49 ---
Oh, and besides, proper range analysis could optimize the above code, even in
the presence of correct (and I mean LIA-1) overflow behaviour of signed ints.
It seems you still didn't even manage to come up wi
--- Comment #35 from andreas at andreas dot org 2007-01-21 17:29 ---
(In reply to comment #34)
> > The range analysis has nothing to do with just assuming integers can't wrap.
> Partly wrong, range analysis is helped by the fact assuming integers can't
> wrap.
A
--- Comment #47 from andreas at andreas dot org 2007-01-22 18:36 ---
It was suggested to me that this issue should be discussed on the mailing list.
If you have an opinion, come there.
--
http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=30475
--- Comment #51 from andreas at andreas dot org 2007-01-22 23:10 ---
Sure, new security checks can be written in a compliant manner.
But what plan do you suggest to find instances of non-compliant overflow
checking in the existing body? Think something like a whole Linux
distribution
