Re: Do big parts of security in "mozilla" suck?

2009-07-20 Thread Udo Puetz
Hi List, I've just tried to reproduce the error with vista and ie7. I wasn't able to create the cert in the popup-window of thawte because the error message that the active-x has to be enabled (at the top of the browser window) wasn't accessible because the (new) popup from thawte was "overlapping"

Re: Do big parts of security in "mozilla" suck?

2009-07-20 Thread Anders Rundgren
Udo, I believe the whole area of on-line provisioning is very immature. MSIE's Active X c**p in Vista is an indication that Microsoft is no better than Mozilla. Although few folks in this list do not acknowledge it, the really big users of on-line provisioned PKI (in the EU) do not use the exi

Re: Do big parts of security in "mozilla" suck?

2009-07-20 Thread Ian G
On 20/7/09 09:18, Udo Puetz wrote: From a usability point of view I would consider the WHOLE thing to be a nightmare. I intended to write up a howto, gave that up now for the time being. And by the way: ASN1, PKCS#7, PKCS#12. Who was the (pardon my french) braindead person to name these things?

Re: CRMF encoding issues with window.crypto.generatedCRMFRequest()

2009-07-20 Thread nk
Hi Nelson, On Jul 18, 2:48 am, Nelson B Bolyard wrote: > On 2009-07-17 17:40 PDT, Daniel Veditz wrote: > > > Moving discussion to mozilla.dev.tech.crypto, but do go ahead and file > > bugs. I doubt 3.5 behaves any differently than 3.0 (you did mean 3.0.10, > > right? If you're using Firefox 2 ple

Re: CRMF encoding issues with window.crypto.generatedCRMFRequest()

2009-07-20 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
On 2009-07-20 05:17 PDT, Nikolai wrote: > I can see what you mean about explicit vs implicit tagging and have > now modified our decoder to lookup the context of the ASN1Object to > see if the value was tagged explicitly or implicitly and rely on the > context to implicitly decode to a particular