On 2014-10-24 07:11, Daniel Veditz wrote:
Your subject, "time to dump NSS", intimately affects NSS developers who
will have to worry about replacing all the things NSS does for us before
they can even start to think about the additional concepts.
I fully understand that.
If you&#x
On 2014-10-24 00:25, Daniel Veditz wrote:
Forwarding to dev-tech-crypto where this is more on-topic.
Dan,
This is not really a cryptographic problem, it rather an platform architecture
and strategy issue.
This single-page presentation shows another part of the puzzle which clearly is
outsid
Your subject, "time to dump NSS", intimately affects NSS developers who
will have to worry about replacing all the things NSS does for us before
they can even start to think about the additional concepts.
If you're proposing a mechanism that can live on the side without
actually d
Forwarding to dev-tech-crypto where this is more on-topic.
-Dan Veditz
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NSS was designed when physically distributed smart cards were anticipated to
become the norm.
This didn't really happen but instead we got mobile devices with support for
TEEs (Trusted Execution Environ
NSS has done a great job but it was designed way back when externally
provisioned smart cards were [to be] the norm.
Mobile OSes nowadays rely on embedded security hardware and for that purpose
NSS doesn't really cut it; neither does its comrade "keygen".
This is less of a problem for Android a
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