ping?
On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 5:15 PM, helpcrypto helpcrypto wrote:
> If I understand correctly, dropping will be "at browser level", ie: end
> users won't be capable of "using" their legacy certificates.
> So far, only SSL certificates < 2048 were shown as unsafe in Chrome. Am I
> right?
>
> Ch
If I understand correctly, dropping will be "at browser level", ie: end
users won't be capable of "using" their legacy certificates.
So far, only SSL certificates < 2048 were shown as unsafe in Chrome. Am I
right?
Chrome [1] plans dropping 1024 by the end of the year. Firefox [2] is goind
to drop
Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Mon, March 16, 2015 1:06 pm, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>>
>> Phase RSA1024 out? I vote for it. Where's the ballot? :)
>
> This is a browser-side change. No ballot required (the only issue *should*
> be non-BR compliant certificates issued before the BR effective date)
>
> https
On Mon, March 16, 2015 1:06 pm, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
> Phase RSA1024 out? I vote for it. Where's the ballot? :)
This is a browser-side change. No ballot required (the only issue *should*
be non-BR compliant certificates issued before the BR effective date)
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/is
Le lundi 16 mars 2015 19:47:30 UTC+1, Ryan Sleevi a écrit :
> On Mon, March 16, 2015 10:24 am, Erwann Abalea wrote:
> > Le lundi 16 mars 2015 10:29:08 UTC+1, Kurt Roeckx a écrit :
> > > On 2015-03-14 01:23, kim@safe-mail.net wrote:
> > > > Is there an agreed timeline for deprecation of the tec
On Mon, March 16, 2015 10:24 am, Erwann Abalea wrote:
> Le lundi 16 mars 2015 10:29:08 UTC+1, Kurt Roeckx a écrit :
> > On 2015-03-14 01:23, kim@safe-mail.net wrote:
> > > Is there an agreed timeline for deprecation of the technologies listed
> > in the initial posting? We should be proactive
Le lundi 16 mars 2015 10:29:08 UTC+1, Kurt Roeckx a écrit :
> On 2015-03-14 01:23, kim@safe-mail.net wrote:
> > Is there an agreed timeline for deprecation of the technologies listed in
> > the initial posting? We should be proactive in this field.
> >
> > For example, last month a plan to dep
On 2015-03-14 01:23, kim.da...@safe-mail.net wrote:
Is there an agreed timeline for deprecation of the technologies listed in the
initial posting? We should be proactive in this field.
For example, last month a plan to deploy 12000 devices to medical professionals
has been finalised, despite t
Is there an agreed timeline for deprecation of the technologies listed in the
initial posting? We should be proactive in this field.
For example, last month a plan to deploy 12000 devices to medical professionals
has been finalised, despite the devices using 1024bit RSA keys - on the grounds
th
On Monday 02 March 2015 13:51:24 Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> On 2015-03-02 13:32, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > Not true. In Alexa top 1 million I found at least 439 servers which
> > support
> > only 3DES and have valid certificates. If Firefox removes RC4, I'm sure
> > that this will make this number effectiv
On 2015-03-02 13:32, Hubert Kario wrote:
Not true. In Alexa top 1 million I found at least 439 servers which support
only 3DES and have valid certificates. If Firefox removes RC4, I'm sure that
this will make this number effectively only larger (80% of servers still
support RC4, 15% prefer RC4 o
On Saturday 28 February 2015 01:03:39 nellie.pet...@safe-mail.net wrote:
> I am using Marlene Pratt's "Proposal to Remove legacy TLS Ciphersuits
> Offered by Firefox" from 13 Dec 2013 on dev-tech-crypto mailing list as a
> guideline.
>
> I present a proposal to remove some legacy ciphersuites from
On 2015-02-28 04:15, Kosuke Kaizuka wrote:
I also propose removing the following ciphersuit:
000A TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
because 3DES is a cipher that requires too much computing power compared to
AES, much more computer memory, lacks hardware acceleration on servers, is
rarely negoti
On 2015/02/28 10:03, nellie.pet...@safe-mail.net wrote:
> I propose removal of the following ciphersuite:
>
> 0032 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
>
> because DSS (the non-EC version) is obsolete, and based on preliminary
> telemetry and Pulse data is not being negotiated at all with any serve
I am using Marlene Pratt's "Proposal to Remove legacy TLS Ciphersuits Offered
by Firefox" from 13 Dec 2013 on dev-tech-crypto mailing list as a guideline.
I present a proposal to remove some legacy ciphersuites from the initial
handshake presented by Firefox.
In Firefox 36, we have removed RC4
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