On Friday 06 May 2016 10:34:37 Zoogtfyz wrote:
> > the larger key size helps w.r.t. quantum computers.
>
> If quantum computers are currently on the level of breaking AES-128,
> then they are on the level of breaking any asymmetric cryptography
> (RSA, DHE or ECDHE key exchange) we are using - whi
Zoogtfyz,
On 5/6/2016 07:34, Zoogtfyz wrote:
Websites that prefer AES-256, such as internal websites, can always
instruct their users/customers to toggle a switch in Firefox to enable
AES-256. I am proposing having AES-256 ciphersuits toggled off by
default.
IMO, that is impractical. I woul
Brian Smith wrote:
> A lot of people have interpreted what I wrote as saying AES-256 is bad.
I was not really referring to what you wrote about AES-256. I was referring to
for example https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/374 . Even though those are related
key attacks (which should not be relevant to *p
On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 10:12 AM, Peter Bowen wrote:
> Is a reasonable path to implement
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-10 and
> treat ECDHE suites as being DHE using a Supported Group? This would
> avoid new cipher suite IDs and accomplish the same result.
I'm imp
On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 9:33 AM, Brian Smith wrote:
> So, I don't think that dropping AES-256 is the right thing to do. Instead,
> the ECDHE-AES-256-GCM cipher suites should be added to Firefox. Note that
> they were just recently added to Google Chrome.
These are also coming to NSS, likely in 3.2
On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 4:33 PM, Brian Smith wrote:
> Zoogtfyz wrote:
>>
>> 3) DHE (not ECDHE) cipher suits are far too often implemented incorrectly,
>> most often with default common DH primes, DH parameter reuse, or generally
>> weak bitstrenght (equivalent to 1024bit RSA, which is already cons
Zoogtfyz wrote:
> This is my recommendation for changes to the supported ciphersuits in
> Mozilla Firefox. I performed rigorous compatibility testing and everything
> works as advertized. I used Firefox telemetry data, SSL Pulse data, and my
> own tests to verify that *not a single* publicly acce
On 05/05/16 15:22, Zoogtfyz wrote:
> This is my recommendation for changes to the supported ciphersuits in
> Mozilla Firefox. I performed rigorous compatibility testing and
> everything works as advertized. I used Firefox telemetry data, SSL
> Pulse data, and my own tests to verify that *not a sing
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