Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-27 Thread Peter Djalaliev
On Aug 27, 2:41 am, Nelson B <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Peter Djalaliev wrote: > > I don't know what you mean by full-blown TPMs. I assume that for you, > > full-blown TPMs = Big Brother. I don't buy into this completely, > > however. > > > TPM-enabled systems are still under implementation and

Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-27 Thread Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla
Nelson B wrote: > Peter Djalaliev wrote: > >> [...] another disadvantage of PKI is that it authenticates only user >> identity, not remote host integrity. > > Disadvantage, as compared to what? > Something that doesn't exist yet? > Big Brother? > > Full blown TPM is not the answer: User's don't

TPMs. Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-26 Thread Anders Rundgren
appears that neither Xenroll, KeyGen nor generateCRMFrequest has what it takes. Anders - Original Message - From: "Peter Djalaliev" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Newsgroups: mozilla.dev.tech.crypto To: Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 07:56 Subject: Re: On use of authenticated cryptogra

Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-26 Thread Nelson B
Peter Djalaliev wrote: > I don't know what you mean by full-blown TPMs. I assume that for you, > full-blown TPMs = Big Brother. I don't buy into this completely, > however. > > TPM-enabled systems are still under implementation and the specifics > of how they are going to function depend on how

Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-26 Thread Peter Djalaliev
Apart from that, I completely approve of TPMs being implemented as PKCS#11 modules. This TPM-enabled feature will probably reach the mass users; it offers clear advantage over storing privates keys on a disk. One problem with smart cards is that users may not understand them. It is a piece of har

Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-26 Thread Peter Djalaliev
I don't know what you mean by full-blown TPMs. I assume that for you, full-blown TPMs = Big Brother. I don't buy into this completely, however. TPM-enabled systems are still under implementation and the specifics of how they are going to function depend on how they will be implemented. However,

Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-26 Thread Nelson B
Peter Djalaliev wrote: > [...] another disadvantage of PKI is that it authenticates only user > identity, not remote host integrity. Disadvantage, as compared to what? Something that doesn't exist yet? Big Brother? Full blown TPM is not the answer: User's don't want Big Brother. However, most T

Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-26 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Hi Peter, Peter Djalaliev wrote: > In this light, another > disadvantage of PKI is that it authenticates only user identity, not > remote host integrity. > Good idea ;-) > If we think of encryption as a single layer of security and PKI > authentication as a second layer, I think eventually we w

Re: On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-25 Thread Peter Djalaliev
> Now, when I send my sensitives data to that party, that party could always > turn around and give my data to my enemies, put it on a road-side bill > board, or disseminate it in various ways of which I don't approve. > Having an authenticated certificate doesn't assure me that the party won't > d

On use of authenticated cryptography

2007-08-25 Thread Nelson B
I'm changing the subject of this thread to a more meaningful one. Michael Vincent van Rantwijk, MultiZilla wrote: > Nelson B wrote: >> Most users of cryptography (all forms, not just https or SSL) mistakenly >> assume that "encrypted" means that no one but the intended recipient can >> read the t