Collective posting to save list-space. Aka "green" posting :-)
Eddy Nigg wrote:
>> i.e. the concept of "Web Signing"?
>What is this supposed to be? Perhaps I missed it?
Ian G wrote:
>What is "Web Signing?"
>And, what are the requirements?
As I wrote in my previous "Slamming S/MIME" posting, m
Anders Rundgren wrote:
Guys,
Let's return to this topic in 5 years or so and see if S/MIME actually has
gotten
any further with respect to uptake. You and me obviously have the opposite
position
on this one. Sort of "Yes we can" versus "No, you can't" to paraphrase a recent
moment in world h
On 11/19/2008 05:52 PM, Anders Rundgren:
In the meantime, wouldn't it be of some value if Mozilla tried to satisfy a PKI-
related activity that in number of users, already is much bigger than S/MIME,
i.e. the concept of "Web Signing"?
What is this supposed to be? Perhaps I missed it?
--
Regar
Guys,
Let's return to this topic in 5 years or so and see if S/MIME actually has
gotten
any further with respect to uptake. You and me obviously have the opposite
position
on this one. Sort of "Yes we can" versus "No, you can't" to paraphrase a recent
moment in world history :-) They say that
Graham Leggett wrote:
> What is "content checking" and what does it have to do with security?
FYI
In Denmark a nationwide PKI has been deployed in the last couple of years. Very
soon after the start we realized that content scanning and S/MIME was clashing
in a number of organisations.
We (th
Paul Kinzelman wrote:
Wow, I guess I really opened a can of worms. Interesting discussion,
but like somebody said, it's really off the original topic I posted.
You should have a look at the ietf-pkix mailing list archive to a get a
feeling about more cans of worms. ;-)
I'm just glad to cont
Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
Michael,
Michael Ströder wrote:
Anders Rundgren wrote:
IM[NS]HO, S/MIME encryption using PKI is one of the biggest security
farces ever.
I don't see why.
Regarding the guide, I believe that e-mail encryption would be fairly
common
if it had been (g
Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
My insurance company chose to deploy webmail with an HTTPS interface
with a shared-secret login (password) for secure messages between
patient and doctors. As a result, I cannot (easily) archive the messages
I receive and send locally. I have to login t
Wow, I guess I really opened a can of worms. Interesting discussion,
but like somebody said, it's really off the original topic I posted.
I'm just glad to contribute something to others that are trying to
wack themselves a way through the jungle of getting secure email
off the ground.
_
Anders Rundgren wrote:
> IM[NS]HO, S/MIME encryption using PKI is one of the biggest security farces
> ever. Even the use-case is often wrong. Somebody representing "e-Health"
> once described for a big audience how S/MIME encryption could be used to
> exchange private medical information betwee
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
'content checking' is to verify that no secrets are included in
anything sent somewhere unapproved. For example, banks and other
fiduciaries need to ensure that private financial data isn't released,
educational institutions need to ensure that educational data isn't
releas
'content checking' is to verify that no secrets are included in
anything sent somewhere unapproved. For example, banks and other
fiduciaries need to ensure that private financial data isn't released,
educational institutions need to ensure that educational data isn't
released, and so on.
It is an
Anders Rundgren wrote:
There is no such thing as secure email at the server level.
For an *organization* this is statement is principally wrong. For an
organization the server is the only place where you actually can perform
security operations including content checking in a cost-efficient w
Michael,
Michael Ströder wrote:
Anders Rundgren wrote:
IM[NS]HO, S/MIME encryption using PKI is one of the biggest security
farces ever.
I don't see why.
Regarding the guide, I believe that e-mail encryption would be fairly
common
if it had been (generally) based on using a shared secret, b
Anders,
Anders Rundgren wrote:
IM[NS]HO, S/MIME encryption using PKI is one of the biggest security
farces ever. Even the use-case is often wrong. Somebody representing
"e-Health"
once described for a big audience how S/MIME encryption could be used
to exchange private medical information bet
Anders Rundgren wrote:
Robert,
Pardon me. I did indeed not intended to slam Paul's guide.
I changed the thread but I don't expect a fruitful debate since the difficulties
are mostly unrelated to NSS. I feel sorry for those who feel that S/MIME
encryption needs to become mainstream because tha
Paul Kinzelman wrote:
Feel free to pass the link around and to comment and suggest
enhancements.
One thing that I frequently suggest is that S/MIME is only a workable
system in general when verification ("signing") is turned on always.
This is because there are architectural flaws in the S/
"mozilla's crypto code discussion list"
Cc: "Bob Relyea" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 20:01
Subject: Re: Slamming S/MIME. Re: How-to guide for email encryption
___
dev-tech-crypto
Anders Rundgren wrote:
Secure e-mail should have been put at the server-level, then we would have
had some base-level security that would cover 99% of all uses. But it
didn't and therefore 80% of all messages are not even coming from the
domain they claim. How very useful.
There is no such t
#x27;s crypto code discussion list"
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 18:55
Subject: Re: How-to guide for email encryption
___
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
_
Anders Rundgren wrote:
IM[NS]HO, S/MIME encryption using PKI is one of the biggest security
farces ever. Even the use-case is often wrong.
Please start your debate in another thread. S/MIME and PKI are a
supported part on the NSS feature set, and supported in pretty much
every email client
Michael Ströder wrote:
It can also work for normal users. The problem is that both ends of
the communication channel have to be willing to do the preparation
work needed.
"Michael Ströder" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The biggest obstacle preventing people to use S/MIME (or even PGP) is
that t
Anders Rundgren wrote:
Of course S/MIME encryption works for PKI experts.
It can also work for normal users. The problem is that both ends of the
communication channel have to be willing to do the preparation work needed.
But how do I send an encrypted message to the IRS?
(S/MIME have been
ot; can do it.
Other (somewhat) related stuff to disagree with :-)
http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg05022.html
BR
AR
- Original Message -
From: "Michael Ströder" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: mozilla.dev.tech.crypto
To:
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 14:13
Anders Rundgren wrote:
IM[NS]HO, S/MIME encryption using PKI is one of the biggest security
farces ever.
I don't see why.
Regarding the guide, I believe that e-mail encryption would be fairly common
if it had been (generally) based on using a shared secret, because passwords
are easier to use
re just an ordinary crook with a network :-)
Anders
- Original Message -
From: "Paul Kinzelman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: mozilla.dev.tech.crypto
To:
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 07:15
Subject: How-to guide for email encryption
I created a file to help a newbie
I created a file to help a newbie get email encryption going.
It's what I wish I could have found when I was stumbling
through the process myself, and with the help of an expert
in this newsgroup (many thanks to you, you know who you are :-),
I've created a document for others.
Feel free to pass
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