On 20 August 2013 14:26, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On 19/08/13 04:07, Brian Smith wrote:
>>> When risk is there to a user of having a network eavesdropper able to
>>> tell that they are using a particular browser? If I had an exploit for a
>>> particular browser, I'd just try it anyway and see if i
On 19/08/13 04:07, Brian Smith wrote:
>> When risk is there to a user of having a network eavesdropper able to
>> tell that they are using a particular browser? If I had an exploit for a
>> particular browser, I'd just try it anyway and see if it worked. That
>> seems to be the normal pattern.
>
>
On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 08:06:49PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> I understand that the MAC itself doesn't make much difference, but
> we should probably avoid MD5. I see no SHA256 MACs except for GCM
> which probably isn't a problem.
I'm having mixed feelings about SHA1 / SHA256. I think it makes
On 08/09/2013 04:30 AM, Brian Smith wrote:
Please see https://briansmith.org/browser-ciphersuites-01.html
First, this is a proposal to change the set of sequence of ciphersuites
that Firefox offers.
So I think there are a whole bunch of things where we have 2 options,
and it's not always clea
Fixed:
I did:
-recreate /etc/openldap/certs moznss database
-chown root:ldap -R /etc/openldap/certs/
-chmod 640 /etc/openldap/certs/*
-recreate /etc/openldap/slap.d/
now it works like a charm
I was missing either file permission to read the database, or there
was mismatch between pkcs12 key and pem
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