Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 6:52 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 09/08/13 18:12, Brian Smith wrote: > > No, each combination is hard-coded into its own distinct code point that > is > > registered with IANA: > > > https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4 >

Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 5:58 PM, Wan-Teh Chang wrote: > On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:36 PM, Rob Stradling > wrote: > > > > Wan-Teh, why do you think Firefox should specify a preference for ECDSA > over > > RSA? > > Because ECDSA is more secure than RSA, and ECC implementations will > become faster

Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 11:13 AM, Camilo Viecco wrote: > Hello Brian > > I think this proposal has 3 sections. > 1. Unifing SSL behavior on browsers. > 2. Altering the criteria for cipher suite selection in Firefox (actually > NSS) > 3. removing certain cipher suites from the default firefox ciph

Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 10:15 AM, Chris Richardson wrote: > I believe this plan would have poor side effects. For example, if Apple > ships clients with a broken ECDSA implementation [0], a server cannot > detect detect if a connecting client is an Apple product and avoid the use > of ECDSA in th