Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-02-21 Thread Kyle Hamilton
On Sat, Feb 21, 2009 at 1:19 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: >>I don't see how the attack could have been done without wildcards. CA >>guidelines say that certificates should not be issued with homographic >>characters that might cause confusion > > They do? Where? I believe that Unicode Technical Report

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-02-21 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 1:28 PM -0500 2/20/09, Benjamin Smedberg wrote: >On 2/20/09 12:11 PM, Nelson B Bolyard wrote: >> Benjamin Smedberg wrote, On 2009-02-19 07:39: >> >>> It sounds to me that we could and should fix this bug simply by disabling >>> punycode for the wildcard portion. >> >> I'm not sure what you're pr

Re: how do we agree?

2009-02-21 Thread Ian G
On 21/2/09 03:18, David E. Ross wrote: On 2/13/2009 11:52 AM, Eddy Nigg wrote: On 02/13/2009 09:36 PM, Ben Bucksch: FWIW, this is irrelevant. *We* require the ETSI. We can also require additional requirements, like that the CPS is published. or you have to add a new policy or practices point

Re: Return of i18n attacks with the help of wildcard certificates

2009-02-21 Thread Ian G
On 20/2/09 20:07, Nelson B Bolyard wrote: Benjamin Smedberg wrote, On 2009-02-20 10:28: Homomorphic characters aren't a problem for wildcard matching. They're a problem for users' eyeballs. The attack that was demonstrated could have been done without wildcards. Changing the wildcard matchi