I think it's also important to note that this attack could as easily
be used to create end-entity certificates. It likely wouldn't be as
huge of a security hole as creating a fake CA, but if we focus on CAs
without realizing that there are other classes of attack thus enabled
we're ultimately doin
why the proposal I made (force CAs to agree not to issue new MD5
certs, and to not allow any sub-CAs signed with MD5) does not cover
your desire.
I said that your proposal DOES (mostly) cover my desire and should be
implemented. I also tried to point out the differences I see between
the prop
On 10/1/09 17:57, Ian G wrote:
On 10/1/09 00:48, someone wrote:
I'm asking you is this by any means legal?
My off-the-cuff entirely not-a-lawyer answer:
Yes: in a company, they own or control all the assets, so they can
distro the MITM root key at their behest.
No: Privacy regulator
Nelson B Bolyard wrote, On 2009-01-10 13:07:
> Ian G wrote, On 2009-01-10 08:57:
>> On 10/1/09 00:48, someone wrote:
>>> But, have you seen this article:
>>> http://www.informationweek.com/news/hardware/reviews/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206904763
>
> Does this come as news to any reader of this
Ian G wrote, On 2009-01-10 08:57:
> On 10/1/09 00:48, someone wrote:
>> But, have you seen this article:
>> http://www.informationweek.com/news/hardware/reviews/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206904763
Does this come as news to any reader of this list?
Such appliances have been around for years. Her
On 01/10/2009 08:59 PM, Paul Hoffman:
That's absurd. You can't hold a CA to doing something that we don't document.
Just a by-note on this one...It doesn't have to be in the CA Policy, but
may be also in some by-laws or as we have it currently in the
"problematic practices". This document i
On 10/1/09 19:59, Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 5:18 PM +0100 1/10/09, Ian G wrote:
That I agree with, although I believe NIST's decisions will be a lot more
important. (Disclaimer: I sometimes consult for NIST.)
Ahhh... no, please! Mozilla needs to do its own analysis. If it can't make up
its ow
At 5:18 PM +0100 1/10/09, Ian G wrote:
>>That I agree with, although I believe NIST's decisions will be a lot more
>>important. (Disclaimer: I sometimes consult for NIST.)
>
>
>Ahhh... no, please! Mozilla needs to do its own analysis. If it can't make
>up its own mind about MDs, which are the s
>The main difference is that my solution would force all MD5 certs out of
>circulation by the given date, no matter their expiration date,
...for no valid security reason...
> while yours would allow MD5 certs with long validity periods to stay in use.
...because there is no security problem wi
On 01/10/2009 08:14 PM, Ian G:
I have been reading most the december threads this week as I came back
from vacation. Not every line, but most. And I have to agree that some
CAs are broken. And in those cases, the solution may be to distrust as
wel.
It was a longgg... thread and came at the
Hi Julien,
to address your very relevant points:
On 9/1/09 21:05, Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
Ian,
Ian G wrote:
If you follow the KCM logic, you would have to give an application
warning, which is completely unwarranted under current standards.
If the new cert is unauthent
On 9/1/09 21:05, Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
Not at all. That's why there is a Mozilla CA policy, and some CAs are
shut out. You need to have at least some audits. Not saying that those
are perfect - obviously they can miss things, but they are usually still
better than nothing. If
On 10/1/09 00:48, someone wrote:
Hi Ian,
First and foremost all the best for 2009!
But, have you seen this article:
http://www.informationweek.com/news/hardware/reviews/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206904763
this bit on page 2:
==
The App-ID capability, while quite impress
- Mozilla changes its rules for CAs in the trust anchor pile to say
that they must not issue certificates with RSA-MD5 starting on some
date (it could even be this year),
Sure, that would be a great way to start with. I think that saying "do
what you want but if you sign certs with MD5 your cu
On 9/1/09 20:00, Paul Hoffman wrote:
You're right, of course, that SHA-1 is heading that way as well,
I never said that. The current best attack on SHA-1 is theoretical because of
the number of steps involved, which is approximately as many as would be needed
for MD5 before the attacks. Atta
On 9/1/09 22:25, Johnathan Nightingale wrote:
Still, it's not nothing either, so if we don't mind extrapolating a bit:
it seems to me that end of 2010, while further out than I'd like, is
probably a good upper bound. At that point we'd have about 4000 valid,
md5 certs out there we'd be breaking,
Certificates are not displayed/selectable from certificates Manager, for
certificates that are stored on a smartcard with Omnikey Smartcard
Reader/Safenet DKCK201 PKCS#11 module.
They are displayed in Firefox 2.0.0.20 and they were displayed in Firefox
3.0.1. FF 3.0.2 and higer doesn't display
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