Re: Some more CA infrastructure questions

To all of my knowledge most questions can be answered with no. Except I guess complaints will be take in any form, including this mailing list. C.J. Adams-Collier wrote: > Hey folks, > > Do we keep track of CA metadata such as: > > * Date of last audit > * Auditor profile > * Canonical domain > *

Some more CA infrastructure questions

Hey folks, Do we keep track of CA metadata such as: * Date of last audit * Auditor profile * Canonical domain * URL of CRL Does the Mozilla Foundation do heartbeat checks on all CAs at regular intervals? Is there any infrastructure in place to remove non-responsive CAs or CAs which fail audits?

Re: Mozilla CA Certificate Policy (Version 1.1) ammendment recommendations

On Nov 26, 2007 9:14 AM, Frank Hecker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > My personal preference would be to create this document first (because > I think it's badly needed), and then to see which parts of the document > might make sense to include in the policy itself. (Note that we could > also inco

Re: TURKTRUST root CA certificate inclusion request

Gervase Markham wrote: > Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote: > >> Maybe it would be adequate to require that the CA applies a policy that >> lowers the risk of homograph spoofing attacks. >> > > I've actually opposed this in the past. Homograph spoofing avoidance > policies are the domain of reg

Re: TURKTRUST root CA certificate inclusion request

Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote: > Maybe it would be adequate to require that the CA applies a policy that > lowers the risk of homograph spoofing attacks. I've actually opposed this in the past. Homograph spoofing avoidance policies are the domain of registries, not CAs. These checks should be don