Re: Forcing specific CA for domain

2006-08-14 Thread Balint Balogh
Hello > In general, this cannot be done. It is possible to put "name constraints" > on CAs that are subordinate to a root CA, but not generally on root CAs. I was afraid of getting an answer like this but thanks for replying anyway. :) > The user has control over which CAs he trusts. If there a

Re: is this a non-intended usage of "roots" module?

2006-08-14 Thread Nelson B
David, As you've already discovered, there's not much difference between the certs being in the cert db versus the certs being in the root certs module. They're just two somewhat different ways to hold certs and their related trust flags. While you're working out the detail, I suggest you keep on

Re: Forcing specific CA for domain

2006-08-14 Thread Nelson B
Balint Balogh wrote: > Hello > > Suppose Example Ltd. runs its own local CA that issues certificates to servers > and email addresses at example.com and its subdomains. The certificate of this > CA is installed as a trusted CA certificate into every browser (Firefox) and > email client (Thunderbir

Re: pkcs#7 envelopeddata decoding

2006-08-14 Thread Nelson B
Michiel van Meersbergen wrote: > Another 'oddity' I should mention, is that the PKCS#11 DLL which provides > access to the appropriate certificates and keys will ask for the proper > authentication itself - in other words, when a private-key function like > 'decrypt', 'sign' or 'unwrap' is called,

RE: OCSP/CRL handling in Firefox

2006-08-14 Thread Krall, Gary
Nelson, Frank and Kai: Because of your terrific feedback and Nelson's comment below about the fact that client revocation is actively being discussed another colleague here in Verisign Engineering has joined this group. His name is Rick Andrews and he will not only be monitoring the discussions b

Forcing specific CA for domain

2006-08-14 Thread Balint Balogh
Hello Suppose Example Ltd. runs its own local CA that issues certificates to servers and email addresses at example.com and its subdomains. The certificate of this CA is installed as a trusted CA certificate into every browser (Firefox) and email client (Thunderbird) of employees. Example Ltd. wa

Re: pkcs#7 envelopeddata decoding

2006-08-14 Thread Bob Relyea
Michiel van Meersbergen wrote: Hello list, I'm running into some trouble with the SEC_PKCS7DecodeItem function. The input for this function is a PKCS#7 EnvelopedData object, which contains just one recipient, a session key (encrypted with the recipients' public key) and the encrypted content

Re: is this a non-intended usage of "roots" module?

2006-08-14 Thread David Stutzman
David Stutzman wrote: I added some certificates to the libnssckbi.so built-ins module that aren't CA certificates. I found I can grab them in the code by prefixing their nickname with "Builtin Object Token:" when I call PK11_FindCertFromNickname. Sometimes when I pass the certificate in to C

is this a non-intended usage of "roots" module?

2006-08-14 Thread David Stutzman
I added some certificates to the libnssckbi.so built-ins module that aren't CA certificates. I found I can grab them in the code by prefixing their nickname with "Builtin Object Token:" when I call PK11_FindCertFromNickname. Sometimes when I pass the certificate in to CERT_VerifyCertificate,

pkcs#7 envelopeddata decoding

2006-08-14 Thread Michiel van Meersbergen
Hello list, I'm running into some trouble with the SEC_PKCS7DecodeItem function. The input for this function is a PKCS#7 EnvelopedData object, which contains just one recipient, a session key (encrypted with the recipients' public key) and the encrypted contents, encrypted with the above m