Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-04-04 Thread Joshua Haase
pet...@riseup.net (2018-04-03 14:32): | In the meantime I hit into this: | | https://github.com/Lyndir/MasterPassword/ | | […] | | Any thoughts why this isn't the perfect solution? I thought about it for | a while and all the cons that I could come up with were false. https://tonyarcieri.com/4-fa

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-04-04 Thread fao_
Any thoughts why this isn't the perfect solution? I thought about it for a while and all the cons that I could come up with were false. If you change your master password you have to change every single one of your accounts. If one account gets broken into you either: 1) have to store metada

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-04-03 Thread petern
On 2018-03-10 03:59, Markus Teich wrote: > Am 2018-03-08 18:47, schrieb pet...@riseup.net: >> Looking at the chacha API one needs to use a nonce, in the monocypher >> implementation it is 24 bits wide, which would give the option of almost >> 17M runs with a single key. IIUC adding a salt would fur

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-10 Thread Sergey Matveev
*** Markus Teich [2018-03-10 21:29]: >You are correct that it doesn't hurt to add a MAC. I was thinking it wouldn't >make sense to authenticate to myself. Could you point me to an attack >scenario >where not having a MAC in this scheme is bad? Actually I can not. Well, those data could be forged b

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-10 Thread Markus Teich
Am 2018-03-11 01:48, schrieb Sergey Matveev: *** Markus Teich [2018-03-10 17:09]: I don't know crypto_argon2i. I'd use the standardized HKDF2 scheme to derive the key. HKDF algorithm is not aimed to be used with passwords. It is ok to be used with Diffie-Hellman outputs for example. Password-

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-10 Thread Markus Teich
Am 2018-03-11 04:21, schrieb Anselm Garbe: On 10 March 2018 at 06:08, Markus Teich wrote: Should be fine, but the salt should not be secret (you need to sync it between devices where you want to use this system after all). The point is that you can give your encrypted database as it is stored

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-10 Thread Anselm Garbe
Hi Markus, On 10 March 2018 at 06:08, Markus Teich wrote: > Should be fine, but the salt should not be secret (you need to sync it > between devices where you want to use this system after all). The point is > that you can give your encrypted database as it is stored on disk to anyone > and they

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-10 Thread Sergey Matveev
*** Markus Teich [2018-03-10 17:09]: >I don't know crypto_argon2i. I'd use the standardized HKDF2 scheme to derive >the key. HKDF algorithm is not aimed to be used with passwords. It is ok to be used with Diffie-Hellman outputs for example. Password-derived keys are required (ideally) to use CPU a

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-10 Thread Sergey Matveev
*** Michael Forney [2018-03-08 22:10]: >I'm no expert either (so follow this at your own risk), but I also did >some investigation, and I think either of the following schemes would >work: >(1) This scheme seems ok and some kind of classical one. Simple and working. >It's not clear to me if it's

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-10 Thread Markus Teich
(1) Setup: - Generate a random salt and store somewhere safe. Note that it should not be required to keep the salt secret. Encryption: - Read the salt from its location and the master password from the console. Use those to generate a key with crypto_argon2i. I don't know crypto_argon2i. I'd

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-09 Thread Markus Teich
Am 2018-03-08 18:47, schrieb pet...@riseup.net: Looking at the chacha API one needs to use a nonce, in the monocypher implementation it is 24 bits wide, which would give the option of almost 17M runs with a single key. IIUC adding a salt would further randomize the output and possibly prevent s

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-08 Thread Michael Forney
On 2018-03-07, pet...@riseup.net wrote: > Looking at the chacha API one needs to use a nonce, in the monocypher > implementation it is 24 bits wide, which would give the option of almost > 17M runs with a single key. IIUC adding a salt would further randomize > the output and possibly prevent some

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-08 Thread Michael Forney
On 2018-03-07, pet...@riseup.net wrote: > On 2018-03-07 00:23, Michael Forney wrote: >> Another related project I've been following is https://monocypher.org/ >> >> It has a quite permissive license and encourages inlining the source >> like you want. > > Hi Michael, > > thanks, this looks really

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-07 Thread petern
On 2018-03-08 06:57, Markus Teich wrote: > pet...@riseup.net wrote: >> I have to yet read up if it is safe to use >> with a single key, i.e. encrypting n passwords with the same secret key. > > Make sure to use salting in this case. Otherwise using the same > password for multiple sites/keys would

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-07 Thread Markus Teich
pet...@riseup.net wrote: I have to yet read up if it is safe to use with a single key, i.e. encrypting n passwords with the same secret key. Make sure to use salting in this case. Otherwise using the same password for multiple sites/keys would be visible. You also want to hide the keys them

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-07 Thread fao_
On 2018-03-06 9:09 am, harry666t wrote: So yes, the entire password store should be kept in one encrypted file and so it can be opened and closed. And then merges become a total pain. You might as well use Keepass. I don't see why this must be so. Just decrypt the password store, merge, and

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-07 Thread fao_
On 2018-03-06 9:01 am, Truls Becken wrote: Some libraries to look at are; libressl, libtomcrypt, nacl.cr.yp.to, libsodium, nettle, libgcrypt and libmcrypt. Has anyone here seen or mentioned bearssl? [https://bearssl.org/] It looks like it meshes with the suckless philosophy quite effectively.

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-07 Thread petern
On 2018-03-07 00:23, Michael Forney wrote: > Another related project I've been following is https://monocypher.org/ > > It has a quite permissive license and encourages inlining the source > like you want. Hi Michael, thanks, this looks really nice and small. I'm doing my homework reading crypto

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-06 Thread Michael Forney
On 2018-03-06, pet...@riseup.net wrote: > On 2018-03-06 10:01, Truls Becken wrote: >> Some libraries to look at are; libressl, libtomcrypt, nacl.cr.yp.to, >> libsodium, nettle, libgcrypt and libmcrypt. > > Hello Truls, > > thank you for this list. I was hoping there would be a publicly > available

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-06 Thread petern
On 2018-03-06 10:01, Truls Becken wrote: > Some libraries to look at are; libressl, libtomcrypt, nacl.cr.yp.to, > libsodium, nettle, libgcrypt and libmcrypt. Hello Truls, thank you for this list. I was hoping there would be a publicly available algo that could be inlined in the source since I rea

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-06 Thread petern
Hi Thomas, On 2018-03-06 00:57, Thomas Levine wrote: > If you copy (vendor) an encryption/decryption algorithm into your source > code, then you are relying on more than libc. So perhaps you could > expand your dependencies to libraries with acceptable licensing or > to libraries that are widely a

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-06 Thread harry666t
> So yes, the entire password store should be kept in one encrypted file > and so it can be opened and closed. And then merges become a total pain. You might as well use Keepass.

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-06 Thread Truls Becken
Some libraries to look at are; libressl, libtomcrypt, nacl.cr.yp.to, libsodium, nettle, libgcrypt and libmcrypt.

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-05 Thread Thomas Levine
, pet...@riseup.net Subject: Re: [dev] securiy guidance Maybe this is off-topic, but I have to make a few corrections. On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 12:57 AM, Thomas Levine <_...@thomaslevine.com> wrote: > > It still uses gpg, but it forces a particular simplified style of usage > that should

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-05 Thread Thomas Levine
If you copy (vendor) an encryption/decryption algorithm into your source code, then you are relying on more than libc. So perhaps you could expand your dependencies to libraries with acceptable licensing or to libraries that are widely available. For example, OpenBSD 6.2 provides blowfish. Also, Gn

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-05 Thread petern
On 2018-03-05 15:15, Kart Etlinger wrote: > Well, all those problems can be solved by pass-tomb addon, but it uses > zsh, which may be some problem for people who dislike zsh as coding > language. > So yes, the entire password store should be kept in one encrypted file > and so it can be opened and

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-05 Thread Kart Etlinger
Well, all those problems can be solved by pass-tomb addon, but it uses zsh, which may be some problem for people who dislike zsh as coding language. So yes, the entire password store should be kept in one encrypted file and so it can be opened and closed. On 03/05/2018 12:16 PM, Truls Becken wrote

Re: [dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-05 Thread Truls Becken
Hi Peter, I know this is not what you asked about, but there is one other thing people dislike about pass; the file hierarchy is in plain text. If you can fix that, you might attract some users. -Truls On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 11:06 AM, wrote: > Hello, > > this mail won't be related to any suckl

[dev] securiy guidance

2018-03-05 Thread petern
Hello, this mail won't be related to any suckless projects, I am looking for some guidance/tips. If this isn't a good place for such requests I can take a hint. Since I stumbled upon suckless.org (2-3 weeks) I switched to dwm and st, read the philosophy and many other pages, browsed through some