On 4/08/2014 7:51 PM, Joel Rees wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 3:53 PM, Andrew McGlashan
> wrote:
>> [...]
>> If you do the /dev/zero against a volume, then no useful data will
>> remain on that volume ... you need to backup that file system first,
>> then restore it after you re-create the file
On 08/03/2014 11:53 PM, Andrew McGlashan wrote:
On 4/08/2014 5:43 AM, David Christensen wrote:
If I know that I will be
setting up a GPT partition table with one primary partition for LUKS
that uses all available LBA's aligned to 1 MB boundaries, zeroing
(/dev/urandom?) the first and last megaby
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 3:53 PM, Andrew McGlashan
wrote:
> [...]
> If you do the /dev/zero against a volume, then no useful data will
> remain on that volume ... you need to backup that file system first,
> then restore it after you re-create the file system again.
Well, that depends on a number o
On 4/08/2014 5:43 AM, David Christensen wrote:
> On 08/03/2014 10:45 AM, Andrew McGlashan wrote:
>> On 3/08/2014 10:48 PM, B wrote:
>>> On Sun, 03 Aug 2014 18:20:19 +1000
>>> I do not agree with that because using only zeros makes
>>> the result part predictable for the attacker:
>> Yes, but th
On 08/03/2014 10:45 AM, Andrew McGlashan wrote:
On 3/08/2014 10:48 PM, B wrote:
On Sun, 03 Aug 2014 18:20:19 +1000
I do not agree with that because using only zeros makes
the result part predictable for the attacker:
Yes, but the method of encryption used (aes-xts-plain64) does NOT lend
its
On 4/08/2014 4:19 AM, B wrote:
> On Mon, 04 Aug 2014 03:45:48 +1000
> Andrew McGlashan wrote:
>
>> Yes, but the method of encryption used (aes-xts-plain64) does NOT
>> lend itself to this kind of analysis.
>
> Not that we know of…
Yes.
> XTS doesn't seem to be a right choice:
> http://sock
On Mon, 04 Aug 2014 03:45:48 +1000
Andrew McGlashan wrote:
> Yes, but the method of encryption used (aes-xts-plain64) does NOT
> lend itself to this kind of analysis.
Not that we know of…
XTS doesn't seem to be a right choice:
http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/04/30/you-dont-want-xts/
> btw aes-
On 3/08/2014 10:48 PM, B wrote:
> On Sun, 03 Aug 2014 18:20:19 +1000
> I do not agree with that because using only zeros makes
> the result part predictable for the attacker: if he knows
> what you wrote, he has a (very) large part of the
> cryptanalysis done…
> This is 1.0.1 of cryptanalysis:
On Sun, 03 Aug 2014 18:20:19 +1000
Andrew McGlashan wrote:
> After you have formatted your volume, but before you start using
> it, you use dd to write /dev/zero to the entire volume -- due to
> the encryption process, those zeros will be just random data based
> on the key, it should be quicker
On 3/08/2014 12:31 PM, David Christensen wrote:
> On 08/02/2014 12:16 PM, Joel Rees wrote:
>> As I understand it, he's asking whether any of us on the users list has
>> anaylyzed the output of both /dev/random and /dev/urandom . Not just
>> whether any of us are having issues with blocking, but wi
On 08/02/2014 12:16 PM, Joel Rees wrote:
As I understand it, he's asking whether any of us on the users list has
anaylyzed the output of both /dev/random and /dev/urandom . Not just
whether any of us are having issues with blocking, but with the randomness
as well.
Another metric is throughput
On 8/3/14, Joel Rees wrote:
> And it occurs to me in the morning that I forgot to explain Paul's
> question.
>
> As I understand it, he's asking whether any of us on the users list has
> anaylyzed the output of both /dev/random and /dev/urandom . Not just
> whether any of us are having issues wi
2014/08/02 11:01 "Joel Rees" :
>
> (For Lisi and Bob and others ;-/)
>
> [...]
> Now, the random typing is not necessary.
And it occurs to me in the morning that I forgot to explain Paul's
question.
As I understand it, he's asking whether any of us on the users list has
anaylyzed the output of bo
13 matches
Mail list logo
