How Debian Linux could be made more secure

1998-04-28 Thread Thomas Roessler
which apply to their systeem. Clearly, maintaining the suid-clearance package will be a rather time-intensive job. This means that it should most probably be done by several people, each of whom will pick the packages they work on. Comments? tlr -- Thomas Roessler · 74a353cc0b19 · dg1ktr · ht

Re: How Debian Linux could be made more secure

1998-04-28 Thread Thomas Roessler
acket's documentation. tlr -- Thomas Roessler · 74a353cc0b19 · dg1ktr · http://home.pages.de/~roessler/ 2048/CE6AC6C1 · 4E 04 F0 BC 72 FF 14 23 44 85 D1 A1 3B B0 73 C1 -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: CERT* VB-98.04: Vulnerabilities in xterm and Xaw

1998-04-28 Thread Thomas Roessler
without the suid root bit. As a solution, we need a wrapper which does pty allocation and starts kind of "client" xterm with user privileges. (Or we need glibc-2.1 and linux 2.1 where non-privileged programs can do proper pty allocation. ;-) tlr -- Thomas Roessler · 74a353cc0b19

Re: PROPOSAL: Services, inetd and xinetd

1998-04-28 Thread Thomas Roessler
e changed; you can then easily import the sample files or keep your local changes. All this is (for additional comfort) combined with RCS version control. Translated to Debian, this would mean that packages would maintain the "sample" files, while users use the "site" dir

Re: How Debian Linux could be made more secure

1998-04-29 Thread Thomas Roessler
aches, or from configuration errors. > [list of questions] > - what will happen, if the program has not the sgid/suid bit ? ACK. > yes. but also every sgid/suid bit that is not necessary > should be removed. Certainly. > i know, that some people do not like suidmanager, and so th