Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
>]] Hanno 'Rince' Wagner
>>
>> I am a very firm believer of giving people as much information as
>> possible while being responsible. Meaning, that I would love to have
>> that documentation - including a big warning sign which sais "if you
>> follow this path, you may bric
The Wanderer wrote:
>On 2022-04-26 at 10:14, Marc Haber wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 23 Apr 2022 18:21:47 +0100, Steve McIntyre
>> wrote:
>
>>> Alternatively, people can build replacement shim-signed packages
>>> using their own root of trust if desired. If we had a large enough
>>> number of users wanting
The Wanderer wrote:
>On 2022-04-26 at 18:05, Paul Wise wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 2022-04-26 at 20:41 +0200, Bastian Blank wrote:
>>
>>> secure boot signing process at Microsoft is a review-sign process
>>
>> What kind of review are Microsoft doing of the Debian shim?
>>
>> Are they reviewing the sourc
]] The Wanderer
> I can't speak to how big of an advantage A is, but B seems to me to be
> pretty important.
It's a manual process that includes poking around in MS' partner portal,
USB HSMs stored in a safe place and rebooting to Windows, then checking
back days (and sometimes weeks) later to d
]] Hanno 'Rince' Wagner
> Hi everbody,
>
> On Sun, 24 Apr 2022, Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
>
> > I don't think we have docs for running with a different root of trust
> > than MS'. To be honest, I'm not sure we even _should_ have a lot of docs
> > around it, since the general brittleness of the boo
On 2022-04-26 at 18:05, Paul Wise wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-04-26 at 20:41 +0200, Bastian Blank wrote:
>
>> secure boot signing process at Microsoft is a review-sign process
>
> What kind of review are Microsoft doing of the Debian shim?
>
> Are they reviewing the source and checking for a reproduc
On 2022-04-26 at 10:14, Marc Haber wrote:
> On Sat, 23 Apr 2022 18:21:47 +0100, Steve McIntyre
> wrote:
>> Alternatively, people can build replacement shim-signed packages
>> using their own root of trust if desired. If we had a large enough
>> number of users wanting a different root of trust,
On Tue, 2022-04-26 at 20:41 +0200, Bastian Blank wrote:
> secure boot signing process at Microsoft is a review-sign process
What kind of review are Microsoft doing of the Debian shim?
Are they reviewing the source and checking for a reproducible build?
--
bye,
pabs
https://wiki.debian.org/Pau
Moin
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 04:14:02PM +0200, Marc Haber wrote:
> On Sat, 23 Apr 2022 18:21:47 +0100, Steve McIntyre
> wrote:
> >We don't have good docs around this in general (hey, it's security
> >software - it's against the law to write good and complete docs!), but
> >I've certainly discusse
Marc Haber wrote:
>On Sat, 23 Apr 2022 18:21:47 +0100, Steve McIntyre
>
>>Better than that, our shim-signed source package always double-checks
>>things here. At build time it removes the Microsoft signature and
>>compares that shim binary to the binary that we submitted for
>>signing. We would sp
On Tue, 2022-04-26 at 16:04 +0200, Marc Haber wrote:
> On Sat, 23 Apr 2022 13:54:59 +0200, Ansgar wrote:
> > Why?
>
> If only I knew. I myself don't feel to comfortable to rely on
> Microsoft being able to pull the plug on us any time. I don't know
> whether they can, but I imagine some kind of r
On Sat, 23 Apr 2022 18:21:47 +0100, Steve McIntyre
wrote:
>We don't have good docs around this in general (hey, it's security
>software - it's against the law to write good and complete docs!), but
>I've certainly discussed this with a few folks over the years.
It would be great to have that writ
On Sat, 23 Apr 2022 13:54:59 +0200, Ansgar wrote:
>On Sat, 2022-04-23 at 12:21 +0200, Marc Haber wrote:
>> >Is the presence of shim-signed on the install media enough to make
>> >people feel somehow contaminated?
>>
>> I think so, yes. Personally, I don't care too much but i can
>> understand why
]] Marc Haber
> Excuse me for asking a user question on -devel, but do we have any
> docs where someone explains how much a security trade off is
> shim-signed relativ to the optimum? I think that using shim-signed is
> surely worse than a directly signed kernel, but I don't know whether I
> can
On Sat, 2022-04-23 at 18:21 +0100, Steve McIntyre wrote:
> If you don't like the fact that Microsoft's keys are involved,
> it's possible on a lot of machines to enrol your own keys
On machines where this isn't possible in the UEFI firmware interface,
IIRC shim-signed is designed to allow you to
Marc Haber wrote:
>On Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:16:42 +0200, Philip Hands
>wrote:
>>I understand the urge to insist upon absolute DFSG purity in the media
>>we produce, but when it comes to wanting to avoid every last shred of
>>data that we could not regenerate ourselves, I think we crossed that
>>line
On Sat, 2022-04-23 at 12:21 +0200, Marc Haber wrote:
> >Is the presence of shim-signed on the install media enough to make
> >people feel somehow contaminated?
>
> I think so, yes. Personally, I don't care too much but i can
> understand why some people might.
Why? Because it contains a third-part
17 matches
Mail list logo
