Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-08 Thread Domenico Andreoli
On November 6, 2018 1:14:03 AM UTC, Paul Wise wrote: >So, really the only reason to support Secure Boot is to avoid users >having to turn Secure Boot off in their BIOS and avoid having to >document how to do that on every firmware implementation that is being >shipped on new hardware. I think i

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-06 Thread Holger Levsen
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 09:21:32AM -0800, Russ Allbery wrote: > >> What is non-free? Signing stuff does not change the freeness of the > >> software. > > it does introduce https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tivoisation however. > I'm not sure how us signing our stuff does that. you are right and I wa

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-06 Thread Russ Allbery
Holger Levsen writes: > On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 10:08:10AM +0100, Bastian Blank wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 01:09:50AM +0100, Adam Borowski wrote: >>> But only the stock kernel, which turns it non-free software. >> What is non-free? Signing stuff does not change the freeness of the >> sof

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-06 Thread Ansgar Burchardt
On Tue, 2018-11-06 at 09:14 +0800, Paul Wise wrote: > AFAICT the Debian Secure Boot packages are not designed for the > scenario where only Debian keys or per-user keys are trusted by the > firmware, if they were then shim-signed would be named > shim-signed-microsoft and there would be a shim-sign

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-06 Thread Ansgar Burchardt
On Tue, 2018-11-06 at 10:42 +, Holger Levsen wrote: > On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 10:08:10AM +0100, Bastian Blank wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 01:09:50AM +0100, Adam Borowski wrote: > > > But only the stock kernel, which turns it non-free software. > > What is non-free? Signing stuff does no

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-06 Thread Holger Levsen
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 10:08:10AM +0100, Bastian Blank wrote: > On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 01:09:50AM +0100, Adam Borowski wrote: > > But only the stock kernel, which turns it non-free software. > What is non-free? Signing stuff does not change the freeness of the > software. it does introduce http

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-06 Thread Bastian Blank
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 01:09:50AM +0100, Adam Borowski wrote: > But only the stock kernel, which turns it non-free software. What is non-free? Signing stuff does not change the freeness of the software. Bastian -- "That unit is a woman." "A mass of conflicting impulses."

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Paul Wise
On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 6:53 AM Adam Borowski wrote: > Another question: do we want it? It's beneficial only if you can not only > add your own keys but also _remove_ built-in ones, and typical "consumer" > machines don't allow that. AFAICT the Debian Secure Boot packages are not designed for the

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Yao Wei (魏銘廷)
Hi, As far as I remember there are some netbooks (from Lenovo) which cannot turn Secure Boot off even if it is x86 based. We can tell user to buy laptop with Coreboot + HEADS preinstalled, or laptops that can turn Secure Boot off, but what if they are installing their existing machine? (I hop

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Steve McIntyre
Hi! Hideki Yamane wrote: > > I'm curious that what is the blocker for introducing secure boot feature > into Debian now? Already kernel, grub2 and shim are signed, then what should > we do to achieve it? We're just working out the last steps on the debian-efi list at the moment. -- Steve McInty

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Hideki Yamane
On Tue, 6 Nov 2018 01:09:50 +0100 Adam Borowski wrote: > But only the stock kernel, which turns it non-free software. Sorry, I'm not sure what you're saying. > There's no benefits for us, too As I said, our users can install Debian easily. It's huge benefit. > -- a thief or attacker can bo

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Adam Borowski
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 09:01:23AM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote: > On Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:52:35 +0100 > Adam Borowski wrote: > > Another question: do we want it? It's beneficial only if you can not only > > add your own keys but also _remove_ built-in ones, and typical "consumer" > > machines don't

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Steve Langasek
On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 11:52:35PM +0100, Adam Borowski wrote: > On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 04:15:31AM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote: > > Hi, > > I'm curious that what is the blocker for introducing secure boot feature > > into Debian now? Already kernel, grub2 and shim are signed, then what > > shou

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Hideki Yamane
On Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:52:35 +0100 Adam Borowski wrote: > Another question: do we want it? It's beneficial only if you can not only > add your own keys but also _remove_ built-in ones, and typical "consumer" > machines don't allow that. I disagree it. With my understand, secure boot support in D

Re: Q: secure boot

2018-11-05 Thread Adam Borowski
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 04:15:31AM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote: > Hi, > > I'm curious that what is the blocker for introducing secure boot feature > into Debian now? Already kernel, grub2 and shim are signed, then what should > we do to achieve it? Another question: do we want it? It's benefic