On Wed, 05 Mar 2014, peter green wrote:
> Also ECDSA shares with DSA the serious disadvantage over RSA that
> making signatures on a system with a broken RNG can reveal the key.
I believe that we should avoid ECDSA gnupg keys and subkeys like the plague
for the time being.
You'd most likely get E
Helmut Grohne writes ("Re: RSA vs ECDSA (Was: Bits from keyring-maint: Pushing
keyring updates. Let us bury your old 1024D key!)"):
> ECDSA is a DSA algorithm and therefore relies on the creation of secure
> random numbers. It has this problem, that if you happen to choose the
&
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 02:33:23PM -0600, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> Umh, I feel I have to answer this message, but I clearly don't have
> enough information to do so in an authoritative way¹. AIUI, ECDSA has
> not been shown to be *stronger* than RSA ??? RSA works based on modulus
> operations, ECDSA on
On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 08:29:37AM +0100, Ondrej Surý wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 4, 2014, at 21:33, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > Ondrej Surý dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100]:
> > > On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > > > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014, at 21:33, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> Ondřej Surý dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100]:
> > On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don
On Wed, Mar 5, 2014, at 7:58, Bastian Blank wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:54:53AM +, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> > > Also ECDSA shares with DSA the serious disadvantage over RSA that making
> > > signatures on a system with a broken RNG can reveal the key.
> > Care to share a source? I thought
On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:54:53AM +, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> > Also ECDSA shares with DSA the serious disadvantage over RSA that making
> > signatures on a system with a broken RNG can reveal the key.
> Care to share a source? I thought that RSA would be vulnerable to poor RNG as
> well.
The a
On 5. 3. 2014, at 5:54, peter green wrote:
>>
>> I am not sure what's the timeframe for GnuPG 2.1.0[1] release, but would
>> it be possible to skip the RSA and go directly for ECDSA, before we
>> start deprecating DSA? Or at least have an option to do so? (Well,
>> unless GnuPG 2.1 release is to
I am not sure what's the timeframe for GnuPG 2.1.0[1] release, but would
it be possible to skip the RSA and go directly for ECDSA, before we
start deprecating DSA? Or at least have an option to do so? (Well,
unless GnuPG 2.1 release is too much far in the future.)
IMO we need to phase out 1024
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100, Ondrej Surý wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> > hamper the project's work, but we defini
Moin!
Gunnar Wolf writes:
> Ondřej Surý dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100]:
>> On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
>> > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
>> > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
>> > hamper th
Ondřej Surý dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100]:
> On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> > hamper the project's work, but we definitiv
On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> hamper the project's work, but we definitively will start being more
> aggressively deprecating their use. 10
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